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Abstract 
In this thesis I investigate three situations in which a principal must make a public 
decision. The optimal decision from the principal's point of view depends on infor-
mation held only by agents, who have different preferences from the principal about 
how the information is used. 
In the first two situations (Chapters 2 and 3) the principals and agents - legis-
latures and bureaus, respectively - are each part of the government and interact to 
create public policy. In Chapter 2 the bureau has private information about the cost 
of a public project, performed for multiple legislative principals who can each seek 
out cost information through oversight. The multiplicity of principals can cause the 
level of oversight to be inefficiently low due to a collective action problem. Further, 
the inefficiency becomes more likely as oversight becomes a more important part of 
the principals' utility functions, and as the oversight technology becomes more effec-
tive. For some parameters an increase in the effectiveness of the auditing technology 
reduces the welfare of the principals collectively. 
In Chapter 3 the bureau has substantive expertise about the effects of various 
policy choices. The principal can delegate policy making authority to the bureau to 
tap its expertise, but bureaus are imperfectly controlled by statutory restrictions. On 
the other hand, the scope for delegation can be reduced endogenously if the legislature 
chooses to acquire its own substantive expertise. I examine how strategic accounting 
vii 
for both bureaucratic subversion and costly development of legislative expertise affect 
the legislature's delegation decision. I also show that legislatures may in fact ,,,ant 
subversion to be "cheap," while bureaucrats may want their own authority constrained 
and subversion to be costly. 
In the third situation (Chapter 4) the information desired by the principal is the 
valuation of an excludable public good for each member of society. I experimentally 
compare three collective choice procedures for determining public good consumption 
and cost shares. The first, Serial Cost Sharing, has attractive incentive properties but 
is not efficient; the other two are "hybrid" bidding procedures that never exclude any 
agents but are manipulable. I characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria in the hybrid 
mechanisms, and prove some more general properties as well. Serial Cost Sharing 
tends to elicit values successfully, but is outperformed on several efficiency criteria by 
a hybrid mechanism - despite its incentive problems and coordination problems due 
to multiple equilibria. 
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Chapter 1 Introd uction 
2 
Many important instances of public decision making involve principal agent re-
lationships. Likewise, asymmetric information is the rule in public decision making. 
Whether their motivations are selfish or benevolent, public decision makers usually 
operate in a world where other agents with conflicting preferences have key pieces of 
information. These facts can have important impacts on the design of public decision 
making processes, and the quality of their outcomes. In this thesis I examine several 
facets of this general problem. 
For two decades the formal political economy literature has recognized legislative-
bureaucratic interaction as having qualities of a principal agent relationship. Agents 
with delegated authority may have better information than legislative principals, but 
they also generally have different preferences. This introduces a control problem. The 
"congressional dominance" literature (e.g., Fiorina 1981, 1982; Weingast and Moran 
1983; Weingast 1984, Calvert, Moran, and Weingast 1987; see the review in Moe 1987) 
has freely invoked the principal-agent metaphor and similar ideas to assume away the 
control problem and argue that legislatures, as designers of bureaucratic structures, 
would be not be subject to the rent extraction noted by Niskanen (1971). Instead, 
to paraphrase Fiorina (1981), as creators of bureaucracies, legislatures would have 
exactly the bureaucracy they want. Political economists have used formal principal 
agent models to probe the merits and limitations of the principal agent metaphor. A 
direct application of mechanism design with adverse selection (Spencer 1980, 1982; 
deFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo 1999; also see Moe 1987) reminds us that while 
legislative principals need not be the feckless victims postulated by Niskanen and can 
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extract information from better informed bureaucrats, this comes at a cost to princi-
pals. As usual in models where agents produce output at privately known cost, when 
information rents are taken seriously, principals cannot get both exactly the policy 
they desire and information revelation. Taking the mechanics of agent control in 
bureaucratic politics more seriously, McNollgast (1987, 1989, 1999) and Bawn (1995) 
have argued that "deck stacking," legislative design of administrative procedures and 
allocation of lobbying rights, can serve a similar purpose to the incentives a principal 
provides an agent. Careful design of bureaucratic structures and processes can allow 
legislatures to control agents remotely. 
The incentives approach of mechanism design theory is one way of modeling solu-
tions to the control problem induced by delegation of decision making authority from 
principals to agents. Another is monitoring of agent activities. For example, Baron 
and Besanko (1984) analyze this in the context of a bilateral principal agent model 
with adverse selection; McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) argue that congressional re-
sponses to interest group complaints ("fire alarms") constitute a more efficient form 
of legislative oversight than constant monitoring of bureaucrats ("police patrols"). 
As has been emphasized in the contracting literature, these approaches can work in 
concert. 
In policy making involving public bureaucratic agents, an important consideration 
is how the multiplicity of legislative (or other) principals affects the efficacy of mon-
itoring (which can be understood as oversight in that context). Chapter 2 analyzes 
this. An agent performs a project for multiple legislative principals (e.g., congres-
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sional committees) at a total cost that is publicly observable, but that is composed 
of an exogenous parameter and endogenous actions that are each observed only by 
the bureaucrat. The principals can design incentive schemes to induce the agent to 
reduce costs, and through oversight can each gather information about the exogenous 
cost parameter for use in designing their incentive schemes. 
Specifically, each principal can purchase a stochastically independent, noisy sig-
nal about the agent's type; with some probability the signal reveals the agent's type, 
and otherwise it reveals nothing. Because of information leakages in oversight among 
principals, oversight by one principal benefits all principals. This creates a positive 
externality, and thus the levcI of oversight activity can be inefficiently low. This 
supports a version of Ogul's (1976) argument that all oversight is subject to under-
provision. Moreover, I show that as oversight becomes a more important part of the 
principals' utility functions, and as the oversight technology becomes more effective 
(the probability of an informative signal rises), the collective action problem among 
the principals gets "worse" - in the sense that more audit costs lead to inefficiently 
low levels of auditing, and that, for some audit costs, an increase in the probability 
of a successful audit can reduce collective welfare among the principals. This sug-
gests that with multiple principals, principals may have an interest in limiting the 
effectiveness of their oversight technologies. Oversight may be halting and ineffective 
because principals are better off that way. 1 
Another way principals can cope with the control problem they face when delegat-
I Contrast this with the McCubbins and Schwartz logic, which holds that oversight is actually 
not halting and ineffective - only a specific, costly variety of it is. 
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ing to agents, in addition to direct incentive schemes, deck stacking, and monitoring, 
is to restrict the choice set available to agents. 2 Along these lines, Epstein and 
O'Halloran (1994, 1995,1996, 1999) initiated a new way of viewing delegation from 
principals toagents like bureaucrats with substantive expertise about the connection 
between choices and outcomes. By restricting the portion of the policy space from 
which the bureaucratic agent can select a policy, the principal can help alleviate the 
control problems associated with delegation. Then the agent will not simply be able 
to choose whichever policy happens to yield her most preferred outcome, given the 
relationship between policies andoutcomes. 
However, this approach leaves out important aspects of the problem principals face. 
In the first place agents are not perfectly controlled by the restrictions principals 
place on the choice set. In politics bureaucratic subversion of legislative dictates 
is typically possible. While agents would face (at least probabilistically) a cost for 
subversive actions, they can take steps to hide them, or commit (through staffing 
decisions, say) to vigorously defend legal action against subversive policies by third 
parties such as interest groups. Thus even with the restrictions legislatures place 
on the discretion of agents to choose among policy alternatives, agents retain some 
residual discretion. Strategic legislators should account for this residual subversion 
ability in making delegation decisions, so ignoring subversion leaves out an important 
part of the story. 
2Indeed the optimal mechanisms literature can be viewed in this way as well. In the typical 
optimal incentive scheme the principal offers a limited menu of options (usually one for each agent 
type) such as output-compensation pairs, among which the agent selects. That selection reveals the 
agent's private information. 
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Moreover, monitoring the information available to the agent is a possibility in 
this context as well. In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency and the 
State Department (for example) are full of career experts who know more about 
the relationship between available policy alternatives and actual outcomes (in terms 
of human health, environmental quality, or international stability) than generalist 
legislators. But legislators need not take this information asymmetry as given. They 
can ameliorate it, but at a cost to themselves. Like subversion, that possibility 
of investigation also affects their willingness to restrict the agent's choice set or to 
delegate at all; thus it is an important part of the delegation decision. 
Chapter 3 brings these elements of subversion and the endogenous development 
of legislative expertise together in one model. As in Epstein and O'Halloran's work, 
the principal chooses for the agent a "delegation window," a (compact, connected) 
subset of the unidimensional policy space from which the agent can make a choice. 
That choice is then added to a random shock to determine the actual outcome, over 
which principal and agent have given preferences. After deciding whether to purchase 
a signal about the random shock, the legislature chooses the location and size of the 
delegation window. The agent can then choose any policy, but faces a cost for policies 
outside the delegation window that is increasing in the distance from the window. 
This captures the "wiggle room" open to agents due to subversion. 
Interestingly, agencies will not necessarily prefer subversion to be "cheap," and 
legislatures will not generally prefer it to be "too" difficult, according to the model. 
Subversion alters the equilibrium relationship between principal and agent; in ac-
7 
counting for subversion the principal can force the agent to "buy" policies that it 
could, with higher subversion cost, choose at lower or no cost - because delegated 
authority would be greater. For its part the principal responds to lower subversion 
costs by shifting the location of the delegation window to the edge of the policy space, 
so that agency subversion can actually be in the legislature's interest. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the information required to make a first best efficient decision 
is contained within the government itself. Principals and agents are both part of that 
government, interacting ccording to political institutions and policy processes as cap-
tured by extensive form games. Moreover, principals and agents may be motivated by 
narrow political gains, broader social concern, or something else entirely; the positive 
political theory of legislative-bureaucratic interaction does not have to take a stand on 
the source of preferences. It is enough that the preferences, and preference conflicts, 
be defined in the appropriate space, and that decision rights be specified as part of an 
extensive form game. 3 But as has long been noted (e.g., Mirrlees 1971, Hurwicz1972, 
Green and Laffont 1979), the same information asymmetries and incentive problems 
affect a more idealized, benevolent, and abstract public decision maker. In addition, 
the information required for first best decisions is not always dispersed among con-
flicting parties within the government; sometimes the agents holding this information 
are the populace. In Chapter 4 I theoretically and experimentally analyze several 
mechanisms available to a principal in such a context. 
More specifically, in that chapter a small group must decide which members will 
30f course to add empirical content it may be both useful and necessary, depending on the model, 
to say more about the sources of preferences (e.g., reelection concerns, budget maximization). 
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consume a binary excludable public good, and how to split its cost. The cost of the 
public good is commonly known but the valuation of each group member is known 
only to him or herself. Thus a principal faces a problem of deciding consumption 
levels and cost shares, while only the agents know the information required for a 
first best efficient decision. Many collective decision procedures are available to the 
principal in such an environment. Some that have appeal on incentive, simplicity, 
transparency, or equity grounds will not achieve theoretical efficiency limits for the 
given environment. Moreover, for mechanisms with multiple equilibria, an important 
part of evaluation is necessarily empirical. 
In Chapter 4 I experimentally examine three different collective decision proce-
dures (formally, mechanisms) in a given economic environment. The procedures are 
Serial Cost Sharing (SCS), a well known mechanism that is strategy proof, budget 
balanced, individually rational, but not efficient; and two hybrid voluntary cost shar-
ing procedures called Proportional Cost Sharing (PCS) and No Rebates (NR). In the 
latter two, agents submit bids of the maximum cost they will pay for the public good, 
conditional on production. If the sum of all group members' bids exceeds the cost of 
the good, it is produced. Furthermore, under PCS, bids in excess of the cost of the 
good are refunded in proportion to bid, while under NIl they are not refunded. Both 
of these are individually rational and PCS is budget balanced. Neither is strategy 
proof. However, both avoid aspects of SCS that cause inefficiency. In particular, dif-
ferent consumers may have different cost shares, and no agent is ever excluded from 
consuming the public good. I analyze some theoretical properties of PCS and NR -
9 
both of which have multiple Bayesian Nash equilibria - for the small group setting, 
and compare the mechanisms on collective grounds based on laboratory experiments. 
Despite its attractive incentive properties, and the fact that it worked "as adver-
tised" in the experiments, and despite the incentive and coordination problems PCS 
faced, SCS was outperformed on two efficiency criteria by PCS: proportion of surplus 
extracted and probability of efficient decision. Comparisons of SCS and NR are more 
subtle. On some efficiency measures, such as probability of efficient decision or con-
sumers' surplus extracted, SCS performed better. But when total surplus extraction 
is the criteria, so excess contributions in NR are not regarded as waste, NR and SCS 
are comparable. The reason for the performance difference between NR and PCS 
comes down to the rebates. PCS lowers the cost of higher bids relative to NR, a fact 
which subjects recognized and responded to with higher bids, more efficient collective 
decisions, and more surplus extracted. 
Previous experimental research on public goods provision has emphasized varia-
tion in the environmental parameters for a given mechanism, the voluntary contribu-
tions mechanism (see Ledyard 1995). For example, experimenters have varied group 
size, marginal per capita return, number of repetitions of the game, communication 
possibilities, subject experience, and even gender of the subjects to estimate the im-
pacts of these variables on contribution patterns. However, most of this literature 
has focused on games of complete information, and even more on pure public goods. 
While this has given experimentalists a common ground to probe in detail, it cannot 
be suggested that this focus is due to the unimportance of other environments. In fact 
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technological excludability is common among public goods, from parks and stadiums 
to security to roads and fisheries. Instead this focus of the experimental literature 
leaves important other public goods problems uninvestigated. Chapter 4 is an effort 
to address that. 
As a whole these chapters form a contribution to the study of how the task of 
principals making public decisions is affected and complicated by information asym-
metries. Public decisions are interesting and contentious often because of limited or 
dispersed information. Policy makers may lack important information about the con-
sequences of available policy choices. Different policy makers or participants in public 
decision making, be they members of a formal government organization or members 
of the public, may have different information and conflicting preferences about how 
to use it. This thesis illustrates some pathologies that can arise in political institu-
tions as a result of the information asymmetries principals face (e.g., oversight in a 
multicameral legislature) ,and how principals can deal with information asymmetries 
(and associated phenomena such as subversion) in specific economic and political 
environments. 
11 
Chapter 2 Multiple Principals and Outside 
Information in Bureaucratic Policy Making 
12 
Abstract 
I examine a model in which a bureaucrat performs a project for multiple legislative 
principals. The cost of the project is publicly observable but the bureaucrat's (exoge-
nous) efficiency and (endogenous) cost reducing activities are not. The principals can 
each perform a costly audit of the bureaucrat's type for use in the design of incentive 
schemes, and the information may also be useful for nonoversight activity. Due to 
information leakages between principals, the information about the agent obtained 
from one audit will benefit all principals. For some values of the audit costs, there is 
a collective action problem in auditing among the principals. Thus, for some model 
parameters the multiplicity of principals causes the level of this form of oversight to 
be inefficiently low. The collective action problem gets worse as the principals care 
more about oversight, and as the auditing technology becomes more effective. In 
addition, more effective oversight technologies can reduce the collective welfare of the 
principals. 
13 
2 .1 Introduction 
An enduring question in the politics of policy making is the "balance of power" 
between legislatures and bureaucrats. Since policy making in advanced democracies 
is fundamentally about these sorts of linkages between institutions, this question 
is not only enduring, but important. Niskanen (1971) modeled the problem as a 
bilateral one where the bureaucrat is a monopoly producer of output valued by the 
unitary legislature. The legislature's demand function is common knowledge, but the 
bureaucrat's cost function is known only by the bureaucrat. In Niskanen's model 
the bureaucrat makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the legislature about the cost of 
supporting output, and thereby extracts most or all of the rent of the transaction 
from the legislature. 
Scholars have critiqued this model by noting that legislatures need not be so pas-
sive in relations with bureaucrats, 1 and that legislators can use oversight to obtain out-
side information and limit the information asymmetry.2 Moreover, bureaucrats care 
about variables besides their budgets, such as reputations, relationships with superi-
ors, and stability.3 Finally, and perhaps most important, bureaucrats face multiple 
legislative principals. 4 For example, bicameralism, the appropriations-authorization 
process, and entrepreneurial committees all present multiple principals to bureaus. 
In this chapter I develop a model that addresses these concerns. I use a common 
ISee especially Spencer (1980); Fiorina (1981); Miller and Moe (1983); McNollgast (1987, 1989); 
Bendor, Taylor, and van Gaalen (1987); Banks (1989); and deFigueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 
(1999) . 
2Sce especially Ogul (1976), McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Banks (1989), Aberbach (1990), 
and Banks and Weingast (1992). 
3Fenno (1966), Kaufman (1981), Wilson (1989). 
4See e.g. Mitnick (1980), Wilson (1989), West (1995), and Waterman and Meier (1998). 
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agency formalization with both hidden information and hidden actions based on that 
of Laffont and Tirole (1991,1993) in regulatory economics. The bureaucrat performs a 
project at some cost for legislative principals, who can each obtain costly information 
about the cost before offering the agent an incentive scheme. The model shows that 
the multiplicity of legislative principals attenuates legislative control over bureaucracy. 
The results still occupy a middle ground between "congressional dominance" and the 
dominated Congress of the monopoly bureau model. 
In the model, any oversight of bureaucrats for which legislators have to trade 
resources - be it "fire alarm" or "police patrol," formal or informal, latent or mani-
fest - may be underprovided due to collective action problems, which in turn arise 
from the multiplicity of principals. As Ogul (1976, p. 181) noted, while members 
of Congress desire more oversight at the collective level, individual incentives often 
dictate leaving it to someone else. In this sense the model supports a version of Ogul's 
argument that all oversight, be it latent or manifest, is subject to underprovision. On 
the other hand, for some model parameters the level of oversight captured here is 
efficient, so as Aberbach (1990) has argued, oversight is not necessarily "Congress's 
neglected function." Thus, these diametrically opposed views of oversight can in fact 
be understood as equilibrium outcomes in one model. 
Furthermore, the more principals use their information networks for oversight 
purposes, and the more effective the oversight technology is, the worse the collective 
action problem will be. In addition, a more effective oversight technology may reduce 
the principals' collective welfare. 
15 
The seminal work on common agency with adverse selection is due to Martimort 
(1992) and Stole (1997). Dixit (1996) developed a common agency model with moral 
hazard in legislative-bureaucratic interaction. Several other models or frameworks 
recognized multiple principals (e.g., Mitnick 1980, Wood and Waterman 1994, Maltz-
man 1997) but prevented the principals from strategically accounting for each other. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 motivates the model 
and lays it out formally. Section 2.3 analyzes the multiple principals model with 
general beliefs about the agent's type. In Section 2.4 I investigate optimal auditing 
by the principals and welfare effects of parameter changes. Section 2.5 concludes. 
Proofs are contained in the Appendix. 
2.2 The Model 
2.2.1 Modeling Issues 
For the formal common agency approach, each principal must be able to offer its 
own incentive scheme to the agent. Budgets are a common focus in the discussion 
of legislative control of bureaucracy (e.g., Banks 1989; Banks and Weingast 1992; 
deFigueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999; but see Ting 2001), and of course, a 
legislature can offer only one budget to an agency. The perspective here is instead that 
the legislative principals each have at their disposal other, nonbudgetary incentives 
(e.g., perks or abuse at the hands of a committee), which they are free to offer as 
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they see fit,5 and which for simplicity the bureaucrat treats as equivalent to money.6 
The empirical literature (e.g., Fenno 1966, Wildavsky 1978, Kaufman 1981, Wil-
son 1989, Aberbach 1990) documents that bureaucrats are interested in these sorts of 
incentives under the control of individual committees, not just budgetary incentives 
of committees acting in concert. Kaufman (1981) documents that avoiding embarass-
ment, of the kind congressional committees are capable of inflicting, is a key priority 
of public administrators. This is not only because of any intrinsic cost of it, cost 
to personal reputation, or loss of outside opportunities, but also because it makes it 
more difficult to manage and motivate subordinates within the bureau. Moreover, 
perhaps because it acts in part as a signal in environments with incomplete informa-
tion, it damages the interaction of bureaus with other stakeholders, such as interest 
groups, other federal or state bureaus, and the Executive Office of the President at 
the federal level. 
Legislative principals find it costly to provide these incentives, positive or negative, 
for the bureaucrat. It takes time from other legislative activity, fundraising, or case 
work. Since these activities have electoral payoffs, there is some opportunity cost of 
time taken from them.7 
Cost reducing activity ("effort") is costly for the bureaucratic agent. Effort spent 
on any project has opportunity costs-for example, if time constraints bind and 
it takes time from other valuable policy initiatives. Moreover, any organization, 
5Baron (2000) uses a similar approach in a bilateral agency model of legislative organization. 
6This is not restrictive if, for example, the bureaucrat cares about budgets and contumely, is risk 
neutral in both, and has an additively separable utility function. Then the assumption amounts to 
a choice of units. 
7 Cameron and Rosendorff (1993) use a similar perspective on the cost to Congress of discipline 
measures in a signaling model of legislative oversight, as does Baron (2000). 
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government bureau or not, has waste due to imperfect coordination that is difficult 
to identify and eliminate. In addition, projects involving subcontracting with private 
firms may involve incentive problems of their own that are costly to reduce. Thus, 
consistent with Brehm and Gates (1997), the assumption of costly effort need not 
imply that bureaucrats like to shirk or are lazy. 
The oversight or outside information available to the legislative principals is costly. 
It may require valuable legislative concessions if provided by interest groups, or valu-
able time for case work, each of which have opportunity costs. Or, if formally provided 
by legislative support agencies like the General Accounting Office at the federal level 
or presentcd in formal hearings, and especially if of a technical naturc, it will take 
time to consume and distill. 
Outside information gathered by one principal is observed by and beneficial to 
all principals. This formalizes Aberbach's (1990) observation that congressional com-
mittees keep tabs on other committees' oversight activities. Given that oversight 
increasingly occurs on the public record, a piece of intelligence about an agency is 
likely to makes its way to multiple principals. On the other hand, nonoversight ben-
efits of information networks can be more proprietary, such as the development of 
innovative policy on topical issues for which legislators can personally claim credit 
and enjoy publicity. 
18 
2.2.2 Formal Structure 
Let there be two principals, PI and P2 , and one agent A. The situation here is 
one of "intrinsic" common agency (Bernheim and Whinston 1986), so the agent can 
contract either with both principals or neither. For simplicity I assume both principals 
are "contracting" with the agent over a single project. Furthermore, the incentive 
scheme of a given principal can be based only on the report of the agent's efficiency 
parameter, and not features of the other principal's contract. This would be the 
case if, for example, one principal's incentive scheme was not observable by another, 
because it was not a matter of public record. 
The agent can perform the project for the principals at cost D = () -~. () E 
(fi, fJ) c !R is A's privately known efficiency parameter, and f. E !R is A's "effort." I{'s 
prior belief is that () is distributed according to some CDF F with strictly positive 
density f. Assume F has a monotone hazard rate: d( ~f:?) / d(} > 0.8 D is publicly 
observable, but neither () nor ~ is: all players know the total cost of the project, but 
the principals cannot disentangle how much is beyond the agent's control. Effort is 
costly for A, with the effort cost given by e(~), e' > 0, e" > 0, e'" 2 0. 9 The function 
e is commonly known. Let ti(D) be the transfer function for Pi, representing the 
transfer to A given cost observation D. Let the agent's utility function be u((}) = 
tl(D((})) +t2(D((})) - e(~((})). Thus by convention the principals pay the cost of the 
project, and can independently offer perks and other benefits to the agent. I assume 
8This assumption helps ensure that the principals do not want to induce pooling, whereby differ-
ent types of agent perform the project at the same cost. Many common distributions (e.g., normal, 
logistic, uniform, exponential) have a monotone hazard rate. 
ge'll ~ 0 has a primarily technical purpose and helps to avoid complications with stochastic 
incentive schemes. 
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these t functions are differentiable, and therefore focus on differentiable equilibria. 
The project, if realized, has value V; > 0 to Pi. The rewards ti(D) are costly for 
principals to offer, so Pi's utility is V; - ti - siD when the project is performed, where 
Si > 0 is the share of the project's cost borne by Pi, and 0 when the project is not 
performed. Li Si :s: 1, so the principals collectively internalize some of the project's 
cost. Yet they may pass some on to the rest of the legislature, as with congressional 
committees in some models of legislative organization. 
Each principal is able to audit the agent, and thereby with some probability 
discover to what extent the cost D is beyond the agent's control (i.e., due to the 
efficiency parameter 0). The auditing technology for Pi is as follows. With some 
probability x, an audit reveals A's true state O. With probability 1 - x, the audit 
reveals nothing and principals keep their prior beliefs. If both principals audit, their 
results are statistically independent. Pi can purchase an audit with cost C, regardless 
of its results. As will be described shortly, the fixed cost of the audit may yield 
benefits for oversight activity that accrues to all overseeing principals, and benefits 
for nonoversight activity accruing to the auditing principal only. 
Denote by p(s) the posterior beliefs held by the principals when S = {SI' S2}, Si E 
{0}U((l, 0), is the vector of audit signals to PI and P2 . Thus p(0) == p( {0, 0}) = F(O) 
(the prior); pee) == p( {0, e}) = p( {e, 0}) = p( {e, e}) is given by Pr(O) = 1 if 0 = e 
and Pr( e) = 0 otherwise. So in the auditing stage before the "contracting" stage, 
information leakage from one principal to another is complete. 
The game proceeds as follows (see Figure 2.1). Nature draws A's type 0 and 
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shows A. The principals simultaneously decide whether to audit by choosing numbers 
nl = 1 if PI audits and 0 otherwise, and similarly for n2. Pi and Pj observe the signal 
from Pi's audit. Then each principal is simultaneously allowed to select an incentive 
scheme to offer the agent, associating a reward ti(D) with each cost observation D. 
Following this the agent chooses an effort level ~. Finally the game ends and payoffs 
are distributed according to the ti functions chosen by the principals. 
Let the choices of ni for any continuation utilities be called an auditing game. 
Let 1;i(e) be the equilibrium utility to Pi in the common agency subgame when Pi 
begins that subgame knowing the true state e. Let Vi(F) be the ex ante equilibrium 
expected utility in the common agency subgame when Pi begins that game with 
uncertain beliefs F about e .10 
Pi's audit has oversight benefits common to all principals and nonoversight benefits 
to Pi only. Let Wt(n), n = 0,1 or 2, be the expected utility to Pi from the entire game 
with oversight when n = nl +n2 audits are purchased. Let Wa(n) = W1a(n) + w 2a(n). 
For general 1f, we have 
Wt(2) = [1f2 + 21f(1 - 1f)][~7i 1;i(e)dF(e)] + (1 - 1f)2(Vi(F)); 
Wt(l) = 1f[~7i 1;i(e)dF(e)] + (1 - 1f)(Vi (F)); 
wt(O) = Vi(F). 
Let Wt(ni) be the exogenous nonoversight benefits, which depend only on Pi'S 
lOThus I am assuming some predetermined selection from the continuum of equilibria entailing 
different splits by the principals of the cost of meeting the agent's constraints. 
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Nature draws e, Each P observes 
shows A each signal 
Ps choose whether to Ps offer transfer 
purchase signals about e schemes t(D) to A: 
transfer as function 
of total project cost 
A chooses effort ~ 
Oversight phase Incentive design phase 
Figure 2.1: Timing of the game 
Payoffs 
distributed 
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audit. Let 
be the total benefit to Pi of the auditing decisions. Thus v E [0, 1] parameterizes the 
importance of oversight in the committees' functions. Let W(nl' n2) = W1(nl, n2) + 
2.3 Incentive Subgame with Multiple Principals 
In this section I analyze the common agency subgame played by the principals and 
the agent for any given beliefs, and therefore, audit results. This is a benchmark 
case to review the results when multiple principals each offer incentive schemes to an 
agent whose performance they all care about, and it defines continuation values of 
the larger game with auditing that will be analyzed later. 
~ 
The agent with type e makes a report e to each principal; the principals then 
recommend an effort level ~ and give transfers t to the agent as a function of the 
announced (j.ll Analytically the principals are choosing the function ~ for the agent, 
and must choose this function and (noncooperatively) choose transfers such that an 
~ 
agent of type e is better off reporting e than any other type e. Thus the principals 
must respect the bureaucrat's feasibility (individual rationality, IR) constraints and, 
if separation is desired, incentive compatibility (Ie) constraints. 
Let 
11 An important issue is how the revelation principle applies in incentive design games with multiple 
principals. Given a mechanism by Pj, there is no loss of generality in restricting Pi to direct 
mechanisms. Martimort (1996b) and Martimort and Stole (1997) discuss this in more detail. 
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~ 
be A's rent as a function of the true type e and the announced type e and 
u(e) == v(e, e) 
be the rent of type e. 
Lemma 2.1 The first or'der condition for' incentive compatibility (IC-1) is d~~IJ) = 
-e'(~(e)), ve E [~, OJ. 
Together with IC-2, the second order condition for incentive compatibility, IC-l is 
sufficient for A's optimization problem, which we shall return to shortly. 
dD(e) 0 
de > . (IC-2) 
The individual rationality constraint says that no type earns negative rent: 
u(e) ~ 0, ve. (IR) 
Because IC-l implies utility is nonincreasing in e, the IR constraints can be replaced 
by U(O) = O. 
Proposition 2.1 Equilibrium effort under common agency with imperfectly informed 
principals is given by e'(~CA(e)) = Sl + S2 - 2~~~)e"(~CA(())). 
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The transfer functions implementing this effort are obtained by integrating the first 
order conditions from the principals' maximization problems, yielding 
(2.1 ) 
(2.2) 
Thus we can state necessary conditions for equilibrium as Proposition 2.1, (2.1), and 
(2.2). 
It is useful to consider briefly how these differ from the benchmark results of the 
bilateral principal-agent model. 
Proposition 2.2 The equilibrium effort in the incentive game with multiple princi-
pals and asymmetric information is distorted downward relative to the second best 
effort, which itself is distorted downward relative to the first best effort. 
Proposition 2.2 is a standard result in common agency models with adverse se-
lection (Martimort 1992, Stole 1997). Given the first and second best outcomes 
described below, it follows straightforwardly from e" > 0, so its proof is omitted from 
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the Appendix. 
The "first best" result with principals behaving cooperatively and complete infor-
mation on e is 
(2.3) 
A unit increase in effort is costly for the agent, but allows the principals to save Sl +S2· 
This says the marginal cost of effort to the agent is equal to its total marginal benefit to 
the principals. Furthermore, for all e the agent is indifferent between performing the 
project and not. This is also the result in common agency with complete information 
about e. 
The "second best" result with principals behaving cooperatively but facing uncer-
tainty about e described by F( fJ) is 
(2.4) 
Bringing effort for any type closer to first best has a benefit, but also a cost: it makes it 
more attractive for more efficient types to behave untruthfully. Equation 2.4 says that 
at the optimum the principal's expected marginal benefit, j(e)(Sl + S2), of increasing 
the effort of a type in [e, e + 6e) is equal to the expected marginal cost, the effort cost 
to the type in question plus the increased informational rent of all agents with type 
in [ft, e). 
The extra distortion in the under common agency is due to a contractual exter-
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nality among the principals. The information asymmetry on B creates the tradeoff 
between efficiency and rent extraction common in bilateral models. This calls for 
downward distortion of the agent's effort, relative to the first best. If one principal's 
contract causes further downward distortion in effort, this leads to lower effort for 
other principals too. But since these other principals in turn are distorting effort 
downward, an increase in effort benefits them. This creates a negative externality 
across principals and leads to excessive downward distortion. 
This approach implies that principals trade less desirable policy outcomes (pro-
duction levels) from inefficient agents for lower informational rents to efficient ones 
(c.f. deFigueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo 1999). Therefore, principals will always 
be dissatisfied with the performance of bureaucrats; but provided some of each type 
of agent exists, only some of this dissatisfaction stems from the information asym-
metry. Common agency implies two sources of dissatisfaction with agency policy: 
the tradeoff with informational rents, and the existence of other principals. Only the 
former benefits any principal. 
Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 are based on differentiable t functions. With incomplete 
information, there are also equilibria with nondifferentiable t functions. The simplest 
transfer functions that illustrate this have each P offer a payment t* when project 
cost D meets some target D*, and -00 otherwise. A optimizes by accepting if 2t* > 
e(B - D*) and rejecting otherwise. Accepting agents simply meet the target cost. As 
B falls below that of the type just willing to accept, agents capture more rent because 
less effort is needed to meet the target. The principals choose the cutoff type to 
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economize on the slack left to the agent types that do produce. In equilibrium, the 
marginal cost of the rent will equal the lost surplus of the marginal agent type. 
The key is that the principals' utility is higher with complete information than un-
der differentiable or nondifferentiable equilibria with incomplete information. There 
would be no slack left to agents more efficient than the cutoff type; that payment 
would be retained by the principals. Moreover, unlike in the nondifferentiable equi-
libria, all agent types would produce some surplus for the principals. Thus, what 
follows is robust to consideration of nondifferentiable equilibria. 
2.4 Noncooperative Auditing 
Now I turn to a representation of oversight of bureaucrats by legislators. I focus 
on a form of oversight, auditing of bureaucrats by nonstrategic third parties, that, 
while simple, still captures many different types of relationships. The important 
point is that legislators must trade some resources, whether direct opportunity costs 
or legislative concessions, for the information in the audit. The key is that since an 
audit by either legislator will mitigate the adverse selection problem faced by both 
legislators, the legislators face a collective action problem about who will become 
informed. Sometimes the signal will not be purchased even when it would be beneficial 
to the legislators collectively. 
While a collective action problem in oversight can arise for any audit accuracy, it 
is different, as will become clear, for the case of perfectly and imperfectly informative 
signals. Thus I treat these cases separately. Following this analysis I examine the 
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welfare effects of increasing 1f, and discuss the benchmark case of integrated principals 
and no collective action problem. 
2.4.1 Perfectly Informative Audits 
Let the audit be perfectly informative, so 1f = 1. In this case it is impossible for 
one principal's signal to be beneficial to the principals collectively, given purchase by 
the other principal. This induces, at the auditing stage, a one-of-two contributions 
game with complete information. The efficient outcome requires purchase either by 
one principal or by neither, depending on the audit cost C. 
strictly positive auditing costs, no equilibrium entails auditing by both principals with 
certainty: when 1f = 1, Wi(l, 1) = Wi(O, 1). Whether any audits are done depends on 
C ;::: Wi(l, 0) - Wi(O, 0), i = 1,2. Assume that for a given C the equilibrium actually 
played in any auditing game is selected from the set of Pareto efficient equilibria in 
that game. 12 This simply stacks the deck in favor of efficiency in the auditing game. 
For notational simplicity let Xi = Wt(1,O) - wia(o, 0) (the marginal oversight 
benefit of auditing to Pi given that Pj does not aUdit) and Yi = w ia(l, 1) - Wt(O, 1) 
(the marginal oversight benefit of auditing to Pi given that Pj does audit). Let 
Zi = Wt(l) - Wib(O) (the marginal nonoversight benefit of an audit to Pi). By 
definition Xi = 1fU: Vi(B)dF(B) - Vi(F)) and Yi = o. 
There are three ranges of C to consider, and one that leads to an inefficient level 
12In particular, the C region where the collective action problem arises has a unique auditing 
game equilibrium. The region with efficient auditing has three equilibria; two are asymmetric pure 
strategy equilibria and are efficient. 
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of aUditing. 
Proposition 2.3 When 7f = 1, the level of auditing is inefficiently low if and only if 
C > maxi (Xi + Zi), and C < Xl + X 2 + Zi for some i. 
Since only one audit can be useful, the inefficiency arises when the cost of an audit 
is less than its collective oversight benefit plus the nonoversight benefit to some prin-
cipal, but greater than the total (selfish) benefit to either principal. When 7f = 1 
and C is either very low or very large, the level of auditing is what it would be if 
principals were integrated or accounted for the effects of their audits on each other. 
This proposition says that only for intermediate values of C can the collective action 
problem arise. The ones where it does arise are simply the ones for which auditing is 
selfishly irrational but still collectively beneficial. 
2.4.2 Imperfectly Informative Audits and Symmetric Prin-
cipals 
In this subsection I assume VI = V2, Sl = 52, WI = W2 , and that the principals 
split equally the cost of the agent's informational rcnt. This simplifies the analysis 
of general values of 7f and focuses attention only on the multiplicity of principals, 
rather than any differences between them. In this case all the marginal auditing 
benefits are equal across principals: Xl = X 2, Yi = Y2, and Zl = Z2. Symmetry at 
this stage therefore implies a selection from the multiple equilibria in the incentive 
subgame with common agency where the principals share equally the costs of the 
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agent's rents. 
When the signal is imperfect in the sense that 7r < 1, the collective action problem 
in the previous subsection can still arise. However, an additional difficulty exists. 
Now it is possible that wa(l, 1) > Wa(O, 1), because of the probability (1 - 7r) event 
that when only principal i audits, the audit is uninformative. Thus purchase by 
both principals can, in expectation, contribute to their collective welfare. That is, 
7f -Y = (7r - 7r2)U~ V(O)dF(O) - V(F)) and X is the same as above. Therefore, X > Y 
when 7r > 0, and the marginal oversight benefit of the first audit exceeds that of the 
second. Further, if 7r > ~, then X > 2Y, and if 7r ~ ~, then X ~ 2Y. 
Proposition 2.4 explicitly relates C to the efficiency of the information gathering 
process. Assume again that for a given C the equilibrium actually played in any 
auditing game is selected from the set of Pareto efficient equilibria. 13 
Proposition 2.4 (i) With symmetric principals and 7r E (~, 1], the level of auditing 
is inefficiently low if and only if C E [Y + Z, 2Y + Z] or C E [X + Z, 2X + Z]. (ii) 
With symmetric principals and 7r E [O,~], the level of auditing is inefficiently low if 
and only if C E [Y + Z, 2X + Z]. 
Proposition 2.3 (restricted to symmetric principals) then is a special case of this one; 
in that case Y = 0. With perfectly informative audits, only C E [X + Z, 2X + Z] is a 
source of inefficiency. Note also that the welfare loss does not vanish as C approaches 
the boundaries of the C regions associated with inefficiency. 
13The regions where one audit is performed (whether one or two are efficient) have symmetric, 
inefficient equilibria. Qualitatively, the results below hold a fortiori if inefficient equilibria are 
selected, but the size of the C interval leading to inefficient results would obviously grow. 
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This result is illustrated in Figure 2.2. In the C - 7r plane, the figure shows lines 
depicting when zero, one, or two audits are efficient and are in the most efficient 
auditing game equilibrium. In the large medium gray area on the right, one audit 
is efficienct, but zero are performed. In the small light gray area, two audits are 
efficiency, but zero are performed. In the black area, two audits are efficienct and one 
is performed. In the white areas the level of auditing is efficient. 
The regions of inefficiency depend on whether 7r is such that X > 2Y. When X > 
2Y, 7r is relatively large. Then given one relatively effective audit and information 
leakage, a second one is not very valuable. On the other hand, the first audit is fairly 
valuable because it is likely to reduce the information asymmetry. This means there 
are audit costs where one audit is selfishly beneficial for a principal, but two audits 
are not even collectively beneficial enough to outweigh marginal cost. In other words, 
for an interval of C's there are auditing game equilibria where one audit is efficient 
and one is performed. But if C falls far enough, two audits will again be efficient (the 
black region in Figure 2.2 for 7r > ~); if it grows enough, no audits will be performed 
even though one would be efficient (the medium gray region in Figure 2.2 for 7r > ~ 
~ see Proposition 2.3). 
When X < 2Y, the first audit is less likely to succeed, so a second audit is 
relatively more valuable. As C increases beyond X + Z in this case, there is still a 
region where it is below 2Y + Z (the light gray region in Figure 2.2 for 7r < ~). In 
that region no principal will audit, even though two audits are efficient. The induced 
auditing game for these C's is simply a prisoners' dilemma. But the marginal benefit 
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Figure 2.2: Efficiency of the auditing game 
33 
of the first audit exceeds that of the second, so as C increases enough to make two 
audits collectively inefficient, one audit can still be efficient even though none will 
be performed (medium gray region in the figure). On the other hand, even if C 
declines enough so one audit is selfishly rational, two audits may still be efficient 
(black region). 
Thus collective action can weaken oversight as a tool of accountability. But a leg-
islature faced with this problem, and not wishing to undo its multiprincipal structure, 
could pursue several remedies. Two natural ones are increasing the effectiveness of 
the oversight technology and creating special oversight committees. 
Proposition 2.5 With symmetric principals and 7r E [0, 1), the range of C 's causing 
an inefficiently low level of auditing is increasing in 7r. 
A more effective auditing technology makes the collective action problem worse. As 
7r increases, the benefit of an audit both to the auditing principal and to the other 
principal increases. But only the first benefit is taken into account in deciding to 
audit. As 7r increases the ignored externality also increases, making the collective 
action problem arise for more C values. 
The following result on the importance of oversight to the principals applies for 
7r E (0,1). 
Proposition 2.6 For 7r E (0, 1), the range of C's causing an inefficiently low level 
of auditing is increasing in v. 
Thus when oversight is a more important part of the committees' functions - say, 
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by making them into special oversight committees-- in a sense the collective action 
problem gets worse. As v increases, an audit becomes more valuable for the auditing 
principal as well as the other principal. The first effect is accounted for in a principal's 
audit decision, but the second is not. As v increases this ignored external benefit 
increases. 
Aberbach (1990, chapter 4) offers some suggestive evidence related to this. Over-
sight committees - for which oversight mattered most as part of the committee's 
function -- tended to have less developed information networks and used them less 
effectively than nonoversight committees. In fact for the three groups of committees 
Aberbach presents, oversight committees have the least well developed information 
networks. New policy proposals tend not to originate in oversight committees, and 
thus their information networks are concentrated on oversight activity. This is not 
true for "substantive" committees, which can use information networks for a variety of 
purposes, some more "proprietary" than oversight (like the development of innovative 
policy). 
Taking the previous two propositions together, some intuitive and practically im-
portant ways of eliminating the collective action problem in oversight do not necessar-
ily have the desired effect. Both more effective audits and principals more concerned 
with oversight make the collective action problem worse. 
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2.4.3 Welfare Effects of Audit Success Probability 
Viewing the welfare gains from auditing as a pie, the previous results say that the 
share of the pie extracted declines in relative terms as 7r grows. It is also important to 
analyze the absolute size of the share extracted - that is, whether welfare can ever 
actually decrease as 7r grows. Interestingly in some cases increases in 7r are welfare 
reducing. 
Proposition 2.7 If for any 7r the equilibrium selected in the induced auditing game 
is efficient, then for C E [Z, Y + Z] there is a 7r* (C) where the principals' equilibrium 
utility declines in 7r. 
The probability 7r* (C) is the 7r > ~ such that for 7r < 7r* (C), two audits arc efficient 
and two are performed, while for 7r > 7r* (C), two audits are efficient but one is 
performedY At 7r* (C), an additional audit would therefore necessarily be welfare 
enhancing for the principals. But at 7r* (C) - E, two audits are performed and are only 
infinitesimally less effective than at 7r* (C). This welfare dominates the equilibrium 
at 7r*(C). 
Figure 2.3 illustrates this result. The solid curves depict the principals' collective 
utility from 0, 1, and 2 audits, and the bold segments trace out their utility in the 
most efficient auditing game equilibrium. For the indicated range of C values, there 
is a positive measure of 7r'S above 7r* (C) such that collective welfare in equilibrium is 
higher at 7r'S just below 7r* (C). 
14There are 7r'S less than ~ with this property, but fixing C, one can only get further from them 
as 7r increases. When 7r > ~, an increase in 7r lowers the marginal value of a second audit, so it is 
efficient only for lower C values. See Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.3: Utility from 0, 1, and 2 audits, as a function of 7f 
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The discontinuity in equilibrium utility at 7f* (C) that causes this result cannot 
be avoided with an appropriate selection from the set of equilibria in the auditing 
game. In addition, the size of the jump in utility at 7f* (C) may change, but it can 
only increase. For ~ < 7f < 7f* (C), the unique auditing game equilibrium entails 
two audits. For 7f*(C) < 7f < 7fe (see Appendix, Proof of Proposition 2.7), the 
auditing game has three equilibria: two asymmetric ones where one principal audits 
with certainty, and a symmetric, mixed strategy equilibrium where each principal 
audits with some probability. 
The principals' utility in the mixed equilibrium is lower than their utility in the 
asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, it is obviously lower than their utility with two 
audits at 7f*: the mixed equilibrium utility is an average over the utility from zero, 
one, and two audits. Thus, the same intuition as in Proposition 2.7 can be applied 
when the (inefficient) symmetric equilibrium is selected in this region. The key is the 
uniqueness of equilibrium below 7f*(C). Since Proposition 2.7 depends on moving from 
this equilibrium to the most efficient one above 7f* (C), moving from this equilibrium 
to a less efficient one above 7f* (C) will not help.I5 
If 7f < ~, total welfare among the principals is clearly increasing in 7f. Extra 
audits are never welfare reducing in the auditing game's most efficient equilibrium. 
When 7f < ~ increases in 7f never reduce the number of audits and sometimes increase 
it, while the probability that they are informative rises. Furthermore, if C is large 
enough, the principals' collective equilibrium welfare is at least weakly increasing in 
15Furthermore, there are obviously other selections from the set of auditing game equilibria where 
increases in 7r reduce equilibrium utility for other values of 7r as well. For example, some equilibria 
have too many audits when 7r > ~, and selecting these can reduce welfare for some increases in 1r. 
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'Jr. 
2.4.4 Cooperative Auditing and Other Solutions to the Col-
lective Action Problem 
This collective action problem in oversight does suggest other remedies the principals 
might pursue to solve it, such as designing their own internal mechanisms. Without 
an external designer their ability to do so would be limited, however. For example, 
the prisoners' dilemma problems mentioned above cannot be solved in this way. One 
might also think of principals in bilateral bargains, trading legislative concessions for 
oversight duties. However, this introduces a new aspect to the cost of oversight, in 
addition to probable information problems that plague efficient resolution of these 
bargains. The standard remedies of repeated play (which increases the benefits of 
long term service on oversight committees, even when seniority would allow for a 
jump to "substantive" committees) and an external enforcer in the legislative or 
party leadership also suggest themselves. The upshot is that recognizing that there 
is a collective action problem to be solved helps to make the institutional structure 
of a legislature more intelligible: rather than revealing a problem with this model, it 
suggests interesting new directions. 
Assuming some effective remedy were found and the principals' decision problems 
were integrated, the problem is straightforward and useful as a benchmark. First, as 
noted in Section 2.3, the principals would face a second, not third, best situation in 
the incentive design phase. 
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Second, while this would reduce the agent's effort distortion, oversight would still 
be beneficial, and oversight decisions would be fully efficient. There would not be any 
external benefit; all benefits would be accounted for in the oversight decision. For 
any Tr and C these decisions can be read off of Figure 2.2. The line 2X + Z and the 
curve 2Y + Z would determine when to purchase one and two audits respectively (Z 
would have to be modified to account for the new constituency). 
Third, equilibrium utility would be continuous and increasing in Tr.16 For all C, 
as Tr increases, the principals would switch from two audits to one just when the first 
audit was so effective that the second was inefficient. In general this equality will 
hold for any change in the number of audits; it is a simple consequence of efficiency, 
and ensures continuity. 
2.4.5 Timing of the Audit 
This chapter has examined oversight in an ex ante sense of costly information about a 
bureau's production processes or expertise, information that is used to design incen-
tive schemes. One can also think of oversight in an ex post sense, such as oversight in 
response to "waste, fraud, and abuse" by administrators. One way to capture this is 
by altering the game order so the agent makes a report, and the principals audit and 
offer transfers as a function of that report. This is similar to the structure in Baron 
and Besanko (1984) in a bilateral agency model. 
More specifically, suppose the principals announce auditing-transfer scheme pairs 
(ni(B), ti(B)), followed by a report Bby the agent. The auditing policy ni(B) associates 
16 At least weakly: for C large enough utility is constant in 7r because there is never an audit. 
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with each report an audit decision 0 or 1. The audit, if informative, reveals A's type 
to both principals and results in production at the first best cost. If the audit is 
uninformative, the principals make transfers to the agent according to the ti functions. 
As before, auditing has cost C and success probability 7r. 
Two features of this formulation stand out. The principals are still better off with 
more information, and there is still an externality among them due to information 
leakage. In deciding to set ni (0) = 0 in response to any given report e, Pi accounts 
for the benefit of an informative audit to itself only. There is also of course a benefit 
to Pj as well, which continues to drive a wedge between the selfish and efficient audit 
decisions, leaving the collective action problem intact. 
In this game the principals simply trade C for a chance at the first best outcome 
for all audited types. But eliminating the rent of any agent reporting (j changes the 
benefit from falsely claiming e, and changes the incentive constraints, as well as the 
objective functions of the principals. Thus, the common agency incentive schemes 
will be different. However, the contractual externality responsible for the distortion 
from second best is still present. Because of the t function of Pj in A's utility, Pi 
can still reduce the information rent that Pi itself must pay to types with positive 
production by distorting effort downward. Thus, the qualitative feature of extra 
distortion remains intact as well. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This model has shown that multiplicity of legislative principals attenuates the control 
they have collectively over a bureaucratic agent. When multiple principals each offer 
incentive schemes to a bureaucratic agent and can audit the agent's type, it is possible 
for a collective action problem to make the level of auditing inefficiently low. On the 
other hand, this is by no means guaranteed. For some model parameters the level 
of aUditing is efficient. Moreover, the more committees use their information for 
oversight purposes, and the more likely it is that the audit is informative, the worse 
the collective action problem will be. Finally, for some audit costs C, there is a range 
of audit success probabilities 'if where the principals' equilibrium utility is lower than 
it would be at lower values of 'if. 
The model could be generalized by allowing nonzero correlation in audit results, 
different probabilities of informative audits for Pi and P2 , and strategic auditors. It 
seems likely that these elements will complicate the exposition and alter the parameter 
ranges where different cases hold, but should not overturn the intuition. 
Likewise, partial (rather than full) information leakage among principals should 
be treated. For example, one principal may only observe a (nondegenerate) garbling 
of another's audit results. Or, audit results per se may not leak at all, but may be 
partially revealed in the incentive subgame through the incentive schemes offered. 
Treating these cases will require a model of common agency with differentially in-
formed principals. Moreover, this model did not consider strategic considerations in 
information transmission among the principals, which could certainly also be inter-
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esting. 
The model assumed simultaneous contract offers and audit decisions by the prin-
cipals, but this is not responsible for the results. Martimort (1999) has shown that 
a similar distortion from common agency remains with sequential offers of incentive 
schemes. With sequential audits, the external benefits of a principal's audit would 
remain as well, given the information leakage. These external benefits would still 
increase with audit success probability and the importance of oversight. The non-
monotonicity of equilibrium utility is also not tied to simultaneity. The result does not 
depend on coordination failures, an inefficiency that can be eliminated with sequen-
tial moves in public good provision problems. Instead it requires that the marginal 
benefit of a second audit decline in 1T when 1T is relatively large, and a selfish reckoning 
of when to audit or not. Given these features, then certain increases in 1T will make 
a second audit irrational for either principal before it becomes inefficient. For such 
increases in 1T there is a slightly smaller increase that leads in equilibrium to more 
but only slightly less effective audits. That is the key to the result, and is not related 
to simultaneous moves. 
Applications of an optimal mechanisms approach to politics bring with them some 
important, and not necessarily desirable, assumptions (c.f. Laffont 2000). In partic-
ular, each principal commits to an incentive scheme. One common way to think of 
this is that reputation matters and engenders commitment (c.f. Bendor, Taylor, and 
Van Gaalen (1987) or Baron (2000)). For example, legislative principals interact with 
a sequence of smaller bureaus in any budget cycle, and across legislative sessions. 
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Nevertheless the robustness of the results to the commitment assumption should be 
examined. 
The model developed here can apply, with some modification, to regulation as well 
- that is, conceiving of (multiple) bureaucrats themselves as principals and regulated 
firms as agents. Similar issues to those examined here (but different from those in 
other regulation models with auditing) arise when regulation is controlled by different 
agencies that can each solicit advice from third parties. 
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Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 2.1: The necessary condition for incentive compatibility is 
av(~ e) = t'(e) + e'(e _ D(e))D'(e) = 0 
ae 
for all but a measure zero set of types 8; using this in d~~() = t' (8) - e' (8 - D( 8))(1 -
D'(8)) gives IC-I. • 
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Writing tl(D(O)) = U(O) - t2(D(e)) + e(.;(e)), taking t2 as 
given, and ignoring IC-2 for the moment, PI wants to solve 
subject to IC-l and U(fJ) = O. The Hamiltonian is 
The Pontryagin Maximum Principle implies a~~) = - ~~ = f (8). Integrating this 
and using the transversality condition J1'(~) = 0 gives 11(0) = F(O). Using this and 
rearranging ~~ gives the first order condition for PI'S problem: 
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P2 's problem leads to an analogous necessary condition. The Hamiltonians for the 
principals' problems are concave in .; so the second order conditions for the principals 
are satisfied. The necessary conditions are also sufficient. 
SiIlce in equilibrium these necessary conditions must have the same effort, we can 
add them and use the incentive compatibility condition to yield the conditions to 
determine A's effort in each state. Differentiating tl (() - ';(0)) + t 2((} - ';(0)) - e(.;(e)) 
with respect to () and setting the result equal to zero at () yields the first order 
condition for incentive compatibility in terms of transfers, 
-t~ (() - .;((})) - t;((} - .;((})) = e'(';((})). 
Substituting this into the sum of the principals' first order conditions gives the equa-
tion defining the agent's equilibrium effort. 
The equation in the proposition must hold for all (), so using its derivative with 
respect to (), the monotone hazard rate assumption, and elll :::: 0 implies that e ::; O. 
Thus D'((}) = 1 - e((}) :::: 0 and A's second order condition (IC-2) is satisfied. • 
Proof of Proposition 2.3: If C > Xl + X 2 + Zi, i = 1,2, there is no inefficiency: 
auditing is too expensive relative to its collective benefits to the principals, and neither 
principal will audit. If C > maxi(Xi + Zi) and C < Xl + X 2 + Zi for either i = 1 
or 2, the audit should be purchased from a collective point of view, but will not be 
in equilibrium, which entails that neither principal audit. If C < Xi + Zi for either 
i = 1 or 2, the audit will be purchased by one principal, as efficiency requires. • 
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Proof oj Proposition 2.4: (i) For C E [Y + Z, 2Y + Z] one principal will audit but. 
an audit by both would be collectively beneficial. For C E [X + Z, 2X + Z] neither 
principal will audit, but by construction an audit by one would be collectively ben-
eficial. If C < Y + Z, C E (2Y + Z, X + Z), or C > 2X + Z, the equilibrium level 
of auditing is the efficient level (two, one, or zero audits respectively). (ii) When 
7r E [0, ~], X ~ 2Y. This case adds the possibility that neither principal audits but 
two audits are collectively beneficial. • 
ProoJ oj Proposition 2.5: If 7r > ~, the size of the range is 2X - X + 2Y - Y = X + Y = 
(27r - 7r2)U: V(O)dF(O) - V(F)). 8(~~Y) = 2U:'Ui(O)dF(O) - V(F))(l - 7r) > 0 for 
7r E (~, 1). If 7r ~ ~,the size of the range is 2X - Y = (7r +7r2 ) U: V(O)dF(O) - V(F)). 
8(2;7r-Y ) = (1 + 27r)U: V(O)dF(O) - V(F)) > O. • 
ProoJ oj Proposition 2.6: Let Ct = v[Wt(l, nj) - wia(o, nj)] + (l-v)[Wt(l) - wt(O)] 
be the cost below which auditing is optimal for principal i. Let Cr = v[wa(1, nj) -
wa(o, nj)] + (1 - v)[Wl(l) - wt(O)] be the cost below which auditing is collectively 
• 
Proof of Proposition 2.7: For any such C, let 7r*(C) be the 7r ~ ~ such that for 
7r < 7r* (C) two audits are efficient and two are performed, while for 7r ~ 7r* (C) two 
audits are efficient while one is performed. At 7r* (C), an additional audit would 
necessarily add a discrete welfare gain: the utility of 1 and 2 audits is equal at some 
47 
7fe > 7f*(C), the utilities from 1 and 2 audits as a function of 7f are continuous and 
increasing in 7f, and the utility from 1 audit increases faster in 7f than the utility from 
2 audits when 7f ~ ~. But an outcome with two audits at 7f*(C) is arbitrarily well 
approximated at 7f* (C) - E for E small enough: at 7f* (C) - E there is a discrete gain 
in welfare compared to 7f* (C) because of the extra audit, and an infinitesimal loss in 
welfare due to the less informative audits. • 
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Chapter 3 Expertise, Subversion, and 
Bureaucratic Discretion 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines a legislature's delegation of policy making authority to an 
imperfectly controlled, expert bureaucrat. The legislature can reduce the bureau-
crat's expertise advantage through costly investigations of its own before delegating. 
Further, the bureaucrat is granted discretionary bounds by the legislature, but can 
subvert legislative dictates by stepping beyond them at some cost. I analyze the inter-
action of preference divergence, investigation cost to the legislature, and subversion 
cost to the bureaucrat on the decision to delegate. The model shows that, because of 
the equilibrium effect of subversion on discretion, bureaucrats will want subversion of 
legislative dictates to be difficult, while legislators want it to be relatively easy. It also 
highlights an indirect effect between preference divergence and discretion: preference 
divergence leads the legislature to become more expert on policy matters, which leads 
it to delegate less. 
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3 .1 Introduction 
Delegation of policy making authority from legislatures to bureaucrats poses fun-
damental questions about policy making in an administrative state. Some of these 
questions, such as why legislatures would ever delegate and how they can cope with 
the control problem delegation creates, have been extensively studied by economists 
and political scientists. An issue that has until recently received less attention is what 
explains the variation in delegation patterns across policy areas. This chapter is an 
effort to contribute to that part of the study of legislative-bureaucratic interaction. 
Delegation has long been understood as a concession to expertise (e.g., Goodnow 
1905); the cost of alternative forms of expertise is important in understanding this 
control problem. The extent of the bureaucracy's technical superiority does not arise 
exogenously. A legislature has a number of other institutional choices available to 
it, such as creating its own experts in the legislative branch, or acquiring expertise 
itself. The costs of other sources of expertise will vary with the technicalities of a 
policy issue; when delegating, strategic legislators should account for other sources of 
expertise with more sympathetic policy preferences. 
Another approach to this control problem is to restrict an agent's ability to choose 
unauthorized policies. However, legislative dictates are often inherently vague, even 
with substantial effort by Congress to spell out the bounds on the agency's authority 
(Mashaw 1990, Schick 1983).1 Even carefully designed administrative procedures 
are not perfect instruments of control, and leave some residual discretion or room for 
lOr more generally with some sort of "equilibrium" (from an unmodeled game) vagueness. 
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"bureaucratic drift" (Bawn 1995; Hill and Brazier 1991; McNollgast 1987,1989,1999). 
For example, if agencies award grants using different factors or different weighting of 
factors than a legislature intended, this will be difficult to detect - even though it 
amounts to choosing a policy the legislature did not authorize. Thus a bureaucrat 
must retain some residual discretion to choose unauthorized policies, even if they 
subvert legislative wishes. The costs of this subversion will vary by policy area,2 and 
strategic legislators should account for subversion in making delegation decisions. 
In this chapter I model delegation from a legislature to an expert bureaucrat that 
is imperfectly controlled by legislative dictates, and how that delegation varies by 
policy area. The legislature decides whether to purchase a signal about a random 
shock affecting outcomes from a given policy choice. Then it decides on the discre-
tionary bounds to place on a bureaucrat with a different ideal outcome, but perfect 
information about the random shock; the bureaucrat then chooses a policy. 
Subversion is represented by allowing the agent to "buy" policies that are out-
side of its discretionary bounds. Agencies can choose policies legislatures did not 
authorize, but as they get further from the constraints, this is harder to hide ex ante, 
and subject to greater costs (loss of status or budgets (but see Ting 2001), lawsuits, 
depleted "political capital") ex post. 
One interpretation of the subversion cost is as a "reduced form" legal costs model. 
Lawsuits by interest groups are a common way to stop bureaucrats from subverting 
2Subversion costs will be affected by tort liability of agency officials, grants of standing to chal-
lenge agency decisions, Freedom of Information Act requirements, ideologies and the level of activism 
of courts granted review powers, technical factors limiting specificity, committees with oversight ju-
risdiction, etc. While some of these factors are endogenous to the political process as a whole, they 
are not all practically endogenous to every instance of delegation. 
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"legislative intent." Since that concept is itself vague, a court's perception of it can be 
malleable, and resources spent on legal action (or committed to legal action through 
human resource choices) can help a court to see things from an agency's point of 
view, or prevent a lawsuit entirely. However, the further agency policy is from its 
discretionary bounds, the more difficult and presumably costly it would be to connect 
that policy to a defensible standard of legislative intent. Alternatively, bureaucrats 
can influence the desire a legislature has to mete out punishments by rallying inter-
est group or legislative support to get constraints overturned, or agency subversion 
ignored. This also comes at some opportunity cost to the agency. 
The model shows that in addition to the direct effect of preference divergence on 
delegation (Epstein and O'Halloran 1994, 1996, 1999), an indirect effect of this dif-
ference also exists: agencies with more extreme policy preferences lead the legislature 
to gather more costly information itself, which reduces the value added of delegation 
and causes less of it. Subversion introduces selection bias in the agencies that receive 
policy making authority (c.f. Banks 1989, Banks and Weingast 1992): they are the 
ones for which subverting legislative dictates is not "too easy." In addition, subver-
sion changes the equilibrium effect of preference divergence on discretionary grants. 
The model also suggests that legislatures may actually want to build some limited 
subversion ability into the administrative policy process. Agencies, by contrast, may 
want to prevent any subversion ability (and would by implication resist discretion 
if subversion were too easy), because legislatures will account for it when granting 
discretionary authority. 
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The general modeling apparatus is related to the work of Epstein and O'Halloran 
(1994, 1995, 1996, 1999). Indeed their delegation game (1999, ch. 4) is essentially 
a special case of this model, when investigations by the legislature are free and sub-
version is infinitely costly.3 The legislative choice of discretion is also related to the 
work of a number of authors. In particular, Bawn (1995) models this with legisla-
tive choice of agency "independence" and the mean and variance of the agent's ideal 
point. McCubbins (1985) captures this with "effective discretion" afforded by varying 
regulatory forms. Ting (2001, 2002) analyzes budgetary slack as a way to enhance 
bureaucratic discretion ex ante. 
Several authors note avenues open to bureaucrats attempting to circumvent spe-
cific legislative constraints (e.g., Brehm and Gates 1997; Hill and Brazier 1991; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; McNollgast 1987, 1989, 1999; Wood and Waterman 
1994) - these ideas are related to the notion of subversion. Ting (2002) discusses 
ex post costs legislatures can mete out in response to bureaucratic noncompliance. 
Similar possibilities are captured here in the cost of subversion. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 I describe the 
formal model and notation. Section 3.3 contains results and discussion; Section 3.4 
contains results on preferences over the possibility of subversion. Section 3.5 discusses 
some examples and illustrations of the model. Section 3.6 concludes. Derivations of 
decision rules and proofs of propositions are contained in the Appendices. 
3The game below can just as easily be considered a different political perspective, in which the 
committee, not the floor of the legislature, is in charge of the delegation decision. 
The model in this chapter does not include the president. Strictly speaking, to make the models 
fully nested the president's choice of agency ideal could be included without changing any results. 
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3.2 A Model of Delegation Patterns 
The game has two players: a Legislature (L) and an Agency (A). The players have 
single peaked utility in outcomes and different ideal outcomes (see below), where the 
set of outcomes is X = R. L and A will denote both the players and their commonly 
known ideal points. I assume that L = 0 and A E (0,1). Outcomes, over which 
preferences are defined, are represented as x = p + w. p is the enacted policy, and w a 
random error that A knows with certainty ex ante, but L does not. For example, given 
an ideal outcome, the optimal reduction of PCBs depends in part on their effects on 
human health, about which there is considerable uncertainty. 
The game proceeds as follows: 
1. Nature selects w from U[O, 1] and reveals it to the agency.4 
2. L chooses v E {O, I}, where 0 means no investigation/signal and 1 means the 
legislature investigates (for which it pays a cost depending on an exogenous 
parameter) and updates beliefs as specified below. 
3. L chooses a level of discretion d ?:: 0 for the agent and a status quo policy q E R. 
4. If L delegates (i.e., d > 0), A names a policy pER and the outcome is x = p+w. 
If L chooses no delegation (d = 0), the final outcome is x = q + w. 5 The game 
ends and payoffs are distributed. 
4It might be objected that in fact A does not know the state variable with certainty. Surely this 
is often true, but the important point for this analysis is that A knows w better than L knows it. 
Making A uncertain about w-provided the uncertainty is less than that faced by L--would not 
change the intuition, but would complicate the exposition. 
5Because of subversion ability, in equilibrium this will cause a discontinuity in outcomes at d = O. 
Nature draws 00, 
shows A 
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L chooses discretion -
status quo pair (d,q) 
L chooses invcstigation 
lcvel v 
If d > a,A choosesp; 
outcome is p + 00 
If d ~ a, outcome is 
q+oo 
Figure 3.1: Timing of the game 
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The model yields equilibrium values of v, d, q and p as functions of each other and 
exogenous parameters. The equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium. 
The sequence of moves in the model roughly follows the stages of policy making 
on some given issue (see Figure 3.1). In particular, it does not exogenously fix the 
extent of the agent's information advantage with respect to the legislature. At the 
same time, w is not costlessly revealed to L after the delegation decision is made. 
Moreover, the broad outlines of Congress's institutional choice are present, if in a 
stylized form. The legislature can delegate extensively, a bit, or not at all. L faces 
a genuine trade-off among possible locations of policy expertise. Finally, statutory 
control over agencies is imperfect. 
Denoting by x the outcome, utilities are represented as follows. For the legisla-
ture,6 
if v = ° 
if v = 1 
where b is an exogenous cost L must pay for investigation. L's prior on the state is 
W rv U[O, 1]. L is endowed with an "investigation technology," by which it chooses 
whether to obtain a costly, noisy signal about w. If it does not investigate (v = 0), L 
simply "learns" that w rv U[O, 1]. If it investigates (v = 1), L pays a cost b and learns 
which half of [0,1] contains the true state, i.e., whether w rv U[O,~] or w rv U[~, 1]. 
It will be convenient to let z denote the posterior mean and let t denote half the 
posterior range. 
For the agent, 
6Quadratic utilities are convenient for obtaining first order conditions but the intuition for results 
does not depend specifically on this. 
57 
UA = -((x - A)2 + 8(p; q, d)) 
where s(p; q, d), the "subversion cost function" facing the agency, takes the form 7 
s(p; q, d) ~ { ~(Ip - ql - d)' if Ip - ql > d 
otherwise 
where the parameter c > 0 varies by policy area. L chooses a discretionary window 
of size 2d centered at q, which is the set from which A may choose policy at no cost. 
However, A can subvert L's dictates by choosing Ip - ql > d. A may step outside its 
discretionary bounds, but pays a higher cost the further it steps.8 
Notes on the Information Structure, Strategy Spaces, and Game Order 
An important interpretive issue is why the legislature cannot observe that its dictates 
were subverted and infer information about w from that fact. It is as if policy choices 
are made "today," but payoffs will not be distributed (and therefore the outcome 
known) until some point in the future~-say an election-when it is too late for the 
legislature to do anything about what is discovered. 
7The specific functional form is useful for explicit solutions but not necessary for comparative 
statics. A strictly increasing, continuous, strictly convex subversion cost function would have similar 
implications, as long as the agent's utility is strictly concave. Then the first order condition in the 
agent's subversion problem (see Section 3.3.1) would guarantee an interior optimum unless the 
agent's ideal outcome could be obtained with a policy p in the discretionary window. This is the key 
feature of the agent's policy choice that L accounts for when investigating and granting discretion. 
RThe subversion cost could be made endogenous by, for example, letting L observe a noisy signal 
of subversion - say, observing subversion with probability 7r and nothing otherwise, to use the 
technology from Chapter 2. Then L's choice comes down to the parameter c. L's preferences over 
c are discussed in Section 3.4. Other legislative choices, like judicial review provisions, can also be 
understood as affecting subversion cost; see Shipan (1997) for a treatment. Since many choices feed 
into subversion cost but involve design issues beyond the scope of this paper, it is convenient to 
leave them "black boxed." 
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Notice that, unlike the preceding chapter, there are no explicit transfers that the 
legislature has as an instrument of control. In part this is because limted side pay-
ments, and crude levers of control in general, are important in politics. The absence 
of transfers can be understood as one way to investigate how this matters analytically. 
Nevertheless, the subversion cost s has a similar impact on A's incentives as policy-
(as opposed to outcome-) conditioned transfers. The main difference between this 
formulation and true policy-conditioned side payments, then, is that L does not take 
into account the negative of these transfers in its own optimization problem. 
Given that L can only control its delegate by restricting the policies it can choose 
(for free), it is optimal for L to restrict A's choices to a connected interval, provided 
the distribution on W is uniform and the policy space is unidimensional. Suppose that 
subversion is impossible and that the agent's choice set has a gap with endpoints Tl 
and Th h < Th), both in the set of feasible policy choices. 9 Then there is an interval 
of w's with midpoint Wm such that for W < Wm , A chooses Tl, and for W > Wm , A 
chooses Th. Thus, the induced outcome as a function of W has slope 1 at all points in 
this interval, except for a discontinuity at W m . As a result, the induced outcome over 
this W range has the same mean whether or not policies in (Tl' Th) are available to A, 
and a higher variance when they are not. Since L is risk averse, it prefers that these 
points be included. Subversion only alters this argument by shrinking the effective 
gap A faces for any given Tt,h. Thus, given the other assumptions of this model, it is 
without loss of generality to restrict L to choosing a "delegation window." 
Another difference between this model and the one in Chapter 2 is that there is 
9 A's choice set must be closed so an optimal choice can be guaranteed. 
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no stage between nature revealing w to A, and L choosing an investigation level, at 
which L solicits a report of w from A. This gets at the issue of whether L conditions 
on policy choices p or outcomes x, discussed above. L can ask for reports of w, but if 
it cannot condition discretion on x and cannot offer outcome-conditioned transfers, 
L would have no levers to pull for incentive compatible reports. 
With the same information structure, Crawford and Sobel (1982) show there may 
be partial separation even without transfers. In their model the agent makes a report 
to the principal, who then makes a policy choice that both principal and agent care 
about. However, in this setting one cannot argue that a reporting stage should be 
present on the grounds that the revelation principle shows it to be without loss of 
generality. Instead whether to have that stage depends more on the interaction one 
is attempting to model. In Crawford and Sobel the commonality of interests over 
the principal's policy choice induces the partial separation. However, if the principal 
does not make the final choice but determines from which (positive measure) region 
the agent will make it (or the costs the agent faces for making it in different regions), 
the incentive for partial separation disappears. As is shown below, L grants more 
discretion the wider is the support of its belief about w- since A is better off in 
equilibrium with more discretion, types of A do not have an incentive to reduce L's 
uncertainty by separating. 
If there were such a reporting stage and outcome-conditioned transfers of utility, 
L clearly would obtain the first best outcome with a "shoot the agent" mechanism. 
If L's transfers had meet an individual rationality constraint, L would sacrifice desir-
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able outcomes for lower informational rents in the usual way. Indeed, since the single 
crossing property holds in this setting, we would have a standard bilateral mechanism 
design problem with adverse selection (c.f. Baron and Myerson 1982), with w inter-
preted as the agent's type. In such a setting subversion is difficult to reconcile with 
the revelation principle, and the meaning of more or less discretion is not as clear as 
it is in this model. However, investigation could proceed much like it does here. 
A Note on the Investigation Technology 
It may be objected that the investigation technology described above limits the gen-
erality of results relative to an updating process with prior and data distribtutions 
combined by Bayes's rule. In this setting the most natural such process is as follows. 
L's prior on the state is w rv U[O, 1]. L chooses whether to obtain a costly, noisy signal 
y about w from a Bernoulli(~) distribution. The signal can either be "high" (y = 1, 
success) or "low" (y = 0, failure). If it does not investigate (v = 0), L simply "learns" 
that w rv U[O, 1] and has posterior distribution and density Fa = wand fa = 1 re-
spectively. If it investigates (n = 1), L pays a cost b, observes a signal about the true 
state, and updates beliefs to Fh or Fl after a high or low signal, respectively. The 
associated densities are fh = 2w and fl = -2w + 2. More generally, L could obtain n 
signals from a Binomial( n, p) distribution and, after observing y high signals, update 
beliefs to a Beta(y + 1, n - y + 1) distribution. 
While this formulation is straightforward and intuitive, it causes tractability prob-
lems later on. With quadratic utilities, even when v can only be 0 or 1, the extra 
w from the posterior density in the expected utility means that an analytically in-
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tractable (and particularly homely) system of equations must be solved to obtain the 
optimal discretion and status quo following investigation by L. Some other strictly 
concave utility (e.g. with a higher exponent or natural log) would a fortiori make the 
problem worse. The alternative, numerical simulation, seems to defeat the purpose 
of added analytical generality. 
In any case, the intuition for the results on investigation (Propositions 3.3 and 3.4) 
is not inextricably linked to this particular technology. It is useful to obtain closed 
form solutions, but the comparative statics are more robust. It is evident from the 
proofs in Appendix A that the main requirements for them are that (i) as L is more 
certain it grants less discretion, and (ii) that as investigation cost rises L investigates 
less. From Section 3.3.2 the first is a property of L's optimal choice given its beliefs, 
however it forms them; the second is obviously robust to the technology. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Agency Policy Making with Subversion 
It is shown in Appendix A that for given values of subversion cost c, status quo q, and 
the discretionary window d, A's equilibrium policy with the possibility of subversion 
IS 
q+d+(A-~.:;:~-w) ifw<A-q-d 
A-w UA-d-q<w<A-q+d 
- d + (A-q+d-w) if A - q + d < w. q c+1 
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So in different regions of the state space, A chooses different policies. In the interme-
diate region in the above expression, A can secure its ideal point without using all of 
its discretion. In the other two regions, A would like to choose a more extreme policy 
and must subvert to do so. A's optimal policy choice given d, q, and c is depicted 
in Figure 3.2. Note that for w > A - q + d, A's policy choice cannot possibly make 
L better off. 
Thus unless the agent achieves its ideal point with a policy inside the discretionary 
window q ± d, it will subvert the legislature's dictates at least to some extent (and 
L is aware of this), but never enough to achieve its ideal outcome. This is because 
subversion cost is a continuous, convex function of the distance between the actual 
policy choice and the edge of the discretionary window. 
For the special case of c = 00 the results collapse to the Epstein-O'Halloran ones. 
A is constrained to choose p E [q - d, q + d]. It is straightforward to show that in this 
case, 
p' = { 
q + d if w < A - q - d 
A - w if A - q - d < w < A - q + d 
q - d if A - q + d < w. 
When (for example) w is relatively small, the agent would like to choose p relatively 
large. Now, however, it is not permitted to choose p > q + d, so it chooses the largest 
policy in its feasible set. 
x 
A 
o 
-A 
z - t 
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A's discretionary window: 
slope = 0 for any c; 
A achieves ideal x 
I 
~ Induced x outside 
discretionary window: 
slope = 1 - 1 (c + 1) 
A-q-d A - q + d z+t 
CD 
Figure 3.2: Agency policy choices and induced outcomes 
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3.3.2 Legislative Choice of Status Quo and Discretion 
Working backwards up the tree, L's first problem is to find a status quo choice and 
a level of discretion that maximize its expected utility, given how the agent will 
respond later in the policy process. Simultaneous solution of first order conditions 
(see Appendix A) yields d* = max{t - A - ~,O} and 
{ 
-z - d. 
q* = C 
-z 
if d > 0 
if d = O. 
(Recall that z is the posterior mean and t is half the posterior range.) Notice that 
at; = ~, which is positive since c> o. Thus, larger c implies more costly subversion 
implies more discretion. Moreover, choosing d ± q such that {w E [z - t, z + tJ : w E 
[A - q + d, z + tn has positive measure is dominated for L. Suppose A - q + d i= z + t 
and let L increase dby an appropriate/::).d and lower q by the same amount, so that 
{w E [A - q + d, z + tl} has measure ° and A - q - d does not change. After this 
change, for w > A - q + d the realized outcome x is constant at A, rather than variable 
in w around points larger than A (see Figure 3.2); for w :( A - q + d the realized 
outcome is unaffected by the change. 
Examining the limiting case of c = 00 helps to reveal the effect of subversion 
at this stage. Simultaneous solution of first order conditions given posterior beliefs 
yields d* = max {t - A, O} and q* = - z = - Ew. Thus, the status quo choice is simply 
the one that in expectation leads to the legislature's ideal outcome (after the random 
shock). This is the case covered in Epstein and O'Halloran (1999), where ~~ = -1 
whenever A E (0, t). The more distant is A's ideal point from L's, the less authority 
L delegates. 
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The optimal choices of the legislature at this stage therefore contain an intuitive 
subversion correction, relative to the no subversion results. Again the status quo is 
based in part on the negative of the posterior mean, but now is even lower in inverse 
proportion to the subversion cost. As subversion cost falls, then provided some 
discretion is still granted, the status quo becomes more negative to account not only 
for L's information about w, but also A's subversion ability. 
Proposition 3.1 If c < (Xl and d > 0, q* = -z - A: L's policy choice is biased 
c 
relative to that leading to L in without the possibility of subversion by the agent. 
That is, the legislature must bias policy choices away from those that lead to its ideal 
outcome without subversion, if it wants outcomes to be closer to its ideal. This is 
because the legislature must count on some possibility of subversion by the agent. 
Suppose in particular that the ideal outcome of the median member of the electorate 
is L. Then, in the presence of an agent who can subvert legislative dictates, policy 
bias (relative to the electorate) cannot be taken as evidence that the legislature is 
unrepresentative. Even if its ideal outcome was identical to the median voter's in 
the electorate, it would still need to bias its status quo policy choice to account for 
subversion. 
Subversion not only causes bias in legislative policy choices, but in which agencies 
will exist as well. 
Proposition 3.2 Provided t > A, at: > 0: as c falls L will 'red'uce discretion d when 
it does give A some control. If c ~ t!A' d* = 0: when subversion is easy enough, L 
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will grant A no policy making authority. 
In other words, the possibility of subversion means that d* = 0 for more A's, and that 
this effect is stronger the smaller is c. Thus, the model predicts a selection bias in 
the agencies that exist and/or receive any policy authority: those agencies in policy 
areas where subversion would be easy enough simply receive no delegated authority. 
This result may be considered a parallel to the one obtained in Banks (1989) and 
Banks and Weingast (1992), in a model of bureaucratic service production. Rather 
than taking policy out of its own hands and putting it in the hands of those who 
"know best," the legislature retains control over policy that it is not as well suited 
to make as some other actors. The reason is that in these cases, the control problem 
introduced by delegation is too costly relative to the expertise gains for the legislature 
to tolerate. 
3.3.3 Legislative Investigations 
Finally, L must decide whether to gather expertise of its own on the policy issue 
-- i.e., whether to purchase the signal (v = 1) or not (v = 0). L's optimal choice 
of investigation depends on whether any discretion is granted later on, because this 
influences decisions later in the game for which L must now account. 
First consider the case where A E (0, }C~l))' For these A values nonzero dis-
cretionary authority is granted whether the legislature investigates or not, which 
happens if and only if b is small enough relative to A and c: b ~ ~A3(1 + ~) = b.lO 
laThe numerical values themselves are simply artifacts of the uniform-quadratic setup. The im-
portant part is the intuition arising from these results and the relationship between the numbers. 
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There is enough commonality of interest between the parties here that L always 
wants A to have some authority. This can be seen from the earlier result that 
d* = max{ t - A - 4, a}. Since t = ~ is the lowest t can be, and in this case A - 4 is 
even lower, some discretion is always granted. 
In the second case, where A E [~C~1)' ~C~1))' nonzero discretion is granted 
only in case v = 0 and L is uncertain enough to tolerate A's preference difference 
and subversion capability. However, investigation can still be useful to L in setting 
policy itself when d* = O. The investigation is worth purchasing if and only if b ~ 
A2 - ~A3(1 + ~) - 418 = b. 
Finally, if A E [~C~l)' 1), no discretion is ever granted, regardless of the investi-
gation decision. Policy is made outside the administrative realm. The investigation 
can again be purchased, however, and will be useful to L as it completely determines 
policy itself. L will investigate if and only if b ~ 1~' The investigation decision here 
is unrelated to A's ideal point. 
Consider what happens to these cutoff b values as subversion cost decreases. In 
the second case, as subversion becomes more costly, L is actually willing to investigate 
for more possible b values-and by implication delegate less. 
This seems like an unintuitive result ~ why investigate more and delegate less if 
subversion is more costly for the agent? ~ until one accounts for the fact that the set 
of A's for which each of these cases holds is itself influenced by c. Since d* = t - A - 4, 
as c falls and subversion becomes easier, the relevant range of A values shrinks and 
moves closer to O. So in order for any delegation to occur, the agent must be closer 
68 
to L as c falls. What is actually being picked up in the second case is that the 
legislature knows it might investigate into oblivion an agent whose ideal point is very 
close to its own, not the backward result that the legislature feels it must put tighter 
constraints on the agent as subversion becomes more difficult. As subversion becomes 
very easy, L knows that it will delegate only to agents who are so close to L, that 
investigation-which will cause discretion to fall to 0 by construction in that case-
becomes less useful. Thus, as c falls, investigation has to actually become cheaper for 
the legislature to do it in this case. 
In the first case, on the other hand, by construction L will delegate whether or not 
it investigates. Therefore, unlike the second case, it must focus on conflict of interest 
with A and possible agency losses. Thus as c falls the range of allowable values of 
investigation cost b that lead L to investigate is larger. 
In spite of the complications on the above cases, the comparative static is that, 
for each given A value in this game, higher values of b make the condition leading to 
investigation harder to satisfy. The legislature will be less informed about the policy 
area, and will delegate more often to bureaucratic agents who are informed, the higher 
is the investigation cost b (for this last statement, of course, A must be sufficiently 
small, given c, for L to grant some discretion). This implies that toleration of agency 
losses (the concession to A implied by grants of wide latitude) from delegation will 
be higher the more costly it is to obtain information through other avenues. 
Proposition 3.3 For a given subversion cost c, a sufficiently large increase in in-
vestigation cost b results in (a) more delegation (change in d* = 0 to d* > 0) 
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if A E aC~l)' HC~l)); and (b) more discretionary authority (increase in d*) if 
Thus, in policy areas with a high cost of creating expertise in the legislature, the 
legislature will rely more on delegation and discretion to make policy. In other words, 
when studying variation in delegation patterns by policy area, the cost of information 
acquisition in a policy area matters as well as divergence in ideal points. 
Moreover, expertise of the agent is a substitute for expertise of the legislature: 
investigation both limits the set of A ideal points that will receive any discretion at 
all, and lessens the discretion granted in those cases where at least some is given. 
Thus, all else constant, the presence of an expert agency causes the legislature to 
investigate less, and to be less informed about policy, than it would without the 
expert. In case A E [iC~l)' ~C~l))' this "substitution effect" is especially clear: the 
legislature either investigates or it delegates. ll 
A robust result in the legislative-bureaucratic interaction literature is that as 
preferences of the legislature and the agency diverge, the legislature will delegate less 
(at least weakly) (c.f. Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001). When the extent of 
the agent's expertise is endogenous, there is another effect of preference divergence as 
well, based on the interaction of preference divergence, investigation, and discretion. 
Proposition 3.4 t! > 0 for all A and t! > 0 for A E [iC~J, ~C~l)): as the 
agent's ideal outcome diverges from the legislature's, the legislature will investigate 
11 Again the special case of c = 00 is instructive. If A E (0, t), discretion is always granted, 
and the legislature will investigate if and only if the signal cost b :::; t A 3 . If A E [t, ~), nonzero 
discretion occurs only in case the signal is not purchased. The signal is worth purchasing if and only 
if b :::; A 2 - t A 3 - -is. If A E [~, 1), no discretion is ever granted. L investigates if and only if b :::; ft. 
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for (weakly) more posBible b 'B. 
Considering Propositions 3.3 and 3.4, then, an increase in A therefore has two effects 
on discretion. The first is the one well known in the literature: as the bureaucrat gets 
more extreme relative to the legislature, it receives less policy making authority. The 
second, indirect effect is that more extreme agents induce the legislature to investigate 
for more possible b values, which leads it to delegate less. 
Figure 3.3 depicts the regions in b, c space where a general A receives nonzero 
discretionary authority. The shaded areas are ones where some discretion is granted. 
Since investigation and delegation are substitutes for each other, for any value of c, 
the area of the shaded region grows as b grows. Furthermore, there are b values such 
that as c increases, and subversion is more costly, L is actually less likely to delegate 
any authority. 
3.4 Preferences Over Subversion Cost 
Subversion cost c is exogenous in the previous sections because the institutional back-
drop against which delegation decisions are made, which will affect the subversion 
cost, is in some sense more enduring than those decisions themselves. It is neverthe-
less interesting to examine the preferences the players have over c, a question that 
sheds some light on the prior issue of institutional design. For simplicity and to focus 
attention on subversion, in this section it is useful to examine the special case of 
b = 00,12 so V = 0 and investigation is not a concern. 
12b = 00 is much stronger than necessary. For any A and any strictly positive c, there will exist a 
finite b above which the legislature will not investigate, so that investigation can be ignored. 
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AI(.5 - A) AI(.25 - A) 
c 
Figure 3.3: Delegation as a function of agent preferences, investigation cost, and 
subversion cost 
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Fixing some A E (0,1), one might expect that the legislature prefers subversion 
to be very costly, and the agency prefers it to be very cheap (at least conditional 
on it being expensive enough to induce d* > 0). Ceteris paribus this is true, but in 
equilibrium it is not -- because of the equilibrium response of q* and d* to changes 
in C. 13 
Proposition 3.5 If c > .5~A so that d* > 0, L's equilibrium utility is decreasing in 
c. If c ~ .5~A so that d* = 0, L's equilibrium utility is constant in c. Further, L's 
equilibrium utility for any c > .5~A is higher than for any c ~ .5~A. 
Moreover, as the agent becomes more extreme, L suffers greater utility loss from a 
given increase in c (see Appendix B). As c declines L responds by granting a smaller 
discretionary window and strategically adjusting its location. Given A's best response, 
the outcome .x is closer to 0 in expectation as c declines. It is also more variable, 
but this second order cost to L is outweighed by the first order benefit of a better 
expected outcome. 
Thus, not only does the legislature lack complete control over the agent in this 
model, it does not want complete control. When subversion is relatively cheap, the 
legislature knows that the bureaucrat is unable to attain its own ideal point as often 
as when subversion is costly (because discretion is smaller the smaller is c), but the 
bureaucrat will still put its superior information to use in deciding to subvert. On the 
other hand, L does not want subversion to be too easy, because then L best responds 
13Thus L's ideal c is not well defined: L wants it as low as possible, as long as c > .5~A. This 
defines an open set, on which a monotonic function (which equilibrium utility is on c E (.5~A' 00)) 
cannot attain a maximum. Since c is not a choice variable in this model, and the purpose here is 
simply to examine the institutional pressures this model reveals, this is not a problem. 
73 
by bypassing the agency. This is L's best response when c is "too low," but L is 
better off when c is high enough to warrant some delegation. 
Administrative scholars have long noted that political control of bureaucracy is 
imperfect (e.g., Goodnow 1900; Hill and Brazier 1991; Mashaw 1990; McNollgast 
1987, 1989, 1999; Schick 1983) - even with conscious effort, American institutions 
allow some agency "slippage" or "wiggle room." Proposition 3.5 is suggestive in light 
of these observations. While legislatures obviously do not prefer all subversive deci-
sions, in this model they are better off if subversion is relatively cheap. It would then 
be less surprising to see imperfect control as a necessary byproduct of administrative 
procedures designed by legislatures. 
As for the agent's preferences, it is fairly intuitive that A does not want c to be 
too low. Low values of c may cause the legislature to bypass agency policy making 
altogether, and its perfect knowledge about the random shock may then never be 
used in policy making. If A could credibly commit to use its superior knowledge 
in certain ways beneficial to both parties, this problem would not arise. However, 
the possibility of subversion combined with the fact that A moves last in the game 
means that such commitment is not possible - by sequential rationality A will use 
any subversion ability to its own advantage (which will be to L's advantage too only 
for certain values of w) - and Pareto inferior outcomes may result. Higher values 
of c mean that the agent is bypassed less often in policy making, and this Pareto 
inefficiency arises less often. In short, if c is such that d* = 0, then A would prefer 
that its subversion ability be constrained. 
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Moreover, even conditional on c > .5~A' A is always better off if subversion is more 
costly. For a given d and q, A is obviously better off when subversion is cheaper. But 
this reasoning does not take into account the equilibrium effect of a lower c on d* and 
q*. 
Proposition 3.6 A's equilibrium utility is increasing in c. 
Again, given A's best response, higher e's moves x closer to 0 on average and increases 
its variance. Both of these effects make the agent worse off. The legislature makes 
up for more costly subversion by granting more discretion in equilibrium: the agent 
then gets wider latitude "for free," rather than having to "pay" for it. Nevertheless, 
faced with the possibility of subversion, A does best by engaging in it when its ideal 
outcome is not attained given d* and q*. The legislature, in turn, does best by so 
adjusting these variables for subversion, because the agent cannot commit to forego 
subversion if such adjustments are not made. 
Proposition 3.6 implies there may be cases when agents resist expansion of their 
discretion. If subversion is easy enough, discretion will be so tightly constrained that 
the agent would be better off with no discretion at all. This is in contrast to the 
implication where subversion is infinitely costly - then agents are always better off 
when their discretion is expanded (c.f. Epstein and O'Halloran 1999). 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate these propositions. In Figure 3.4, a nonequilibrium 
figure, q and d are held constant and c declines. This clearly benefits A, as the 
expected outcome is closer to its ideal and the variance in outcomes decreases. While 
the lower variance in outcome benefits L, it is of second order, and is swamped by 
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the first order effect of a less attractive expected outcome. In Figure 3.5, on the other 
hand, the equilibrium effect of lowering c is represented. Now A faces both higher 
variance and a less attractive expectation as c falls. L is worse off in the second order 
because of the higher variance, but is better off in the first order because of the more 
attractive mean. 
Figure 3.5 shows that when subversion is possible, q ± d does double duty for L. 
For any c, it serves to rule out policy choices that could never benefit L in any state 
of the world; for finite c, it allows L to force A to "buy" what it used to get for free. 
This assures that A's policy choices are more in line with L's interests. 
3.5 Empirical Implications 
Proposition 3.1, on the bias in legislative policy under subversion, and the assump-
tion that c > 0 imply that ceteris paribus, as a legislature grants less discretionary 
authority, the enacted policy is closer to the median ideal point in the legislature. 
Importantly, the converse is not true. When enacted policy is closer to the median of 
the legislature, it may be because for a given subversion cost less discretion has been 
granted, but it may also be that subversion cost is higher. The latter implies both 
more discretion for agents and enacted policy closer to the legislature's median. 
Proposition 3.2 on selection bias in extant agencies may help illuminate phenom-
ena such as the direction of environmental policy in the early 1970s. Before the EPA 
came into its own, there was some concern that delegating authority to agencies heav-
ily influenced by anti-environmental constituencies would cause them to steer policy 
x 
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Induced outcome when c < 00: 
slope = 1 - 1 (c + 1) < 1 
________ Induced outcome when 
c = 00: slope = 1 
A-q-d 
Figure 3.4: Nonequilibrium effect of change in subversion cost 
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Induced outcome when 
c=2A(t-A) 
Induced outcome as 
c =A(t -A) + E 
A - q(c) - d(c) A - q(c') - d(c') 
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium effect of change in subversion cost 
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outcomes in their own favor, despite congressional directives not to. A solution was 
to use citizen suits to enforce pollution standards, rather than use traditional bu-
reaucratic channels. Judge Skelly Wright, involved in one such 1971 suit, had said 
that the goal of the new pollution suits was to assure that important congressional 
intentions to reduce pollution not be "lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the 
federal bureaucracy" (Glaberson 1999). From the perspective of this model, in other 
words, subversion would have been too easy for existing agencies, so Congress opted 
not to entrust policy to them. 
Subversion cost was motivated in part by the possibility of legal challenges to 
agency policy choices. If courts with jurisdiction over agency policy arc closely aligned 
with them ideologically, it will be easier for agencies to legitimize their preferred pol-
icy choices. One direct implication of Proposition 3.2, then, is that as preferences of 
an agency and judges with jurisdiction over that agency diverge, discretion should 
increase. This is reminiscent of the McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) fire alarm over-
sight logic: legislatures economize on oversight by "farming it out" to third parties. 
Proposition 3.2 takes this logic to the issue of when delegation will occur. 
Throughout careers on certain committees and work on certain issues, legislators 
themselves and their staffs, while they may not necessarily match executive branch 
experts, can acquire a considerable body of policy expertise. Therefore, under the 
ancillary hypothesis that this expertise tends to increase with a legislator's tenure 
on a given committee, one can operationalize the cost of expertise as the average 
number of years committee members have spent on the committee. 14 An implication 
11 An alternative measure would be the number of years the chair or longest serving member has 
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of Proposition 3.3 on the relationship between band d* therefore is that as committee 
tenure increases, less discretion is granted to agencies. 15 
Another implication of Proposition 3.3 comes from a different way of viewing the 
legislature's costs of expertise. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the technical education 
required in a field increases the amount of discretion to bureaucratic policy makers 
in that field. However, this must be separated from the hypothesis that Congress 
is fully in control of the bureaucracy, and thus gets more utility from delegating to 
these experts without any loss. A finer prediction that discriminates between these 
two hypotheses is that in areas where the education level of bureaucratic policy makers 
is very high, discretion is greater when the field of education is very different from 
the fields of most legislators. Thus, scientists, engineers, and possibly statisbcians 
and economists should get more discretionary authority than lawyers and liberally 
educated policy makers, all else constant. 
Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 (on the relationship between v and A) suggest that agency 
policy output should be less responsive to changes in congressional preferences the 
greater is the cost of expertise. This is an operationalization of the argument that 
greater agency losses are tolerated when expertise is more expensive. Thus, as the 
tenure of a committee chair or the average committee member increases, agency policy 
should be more responsive to changes in committee preferences. 
spent on the committee. 
I5It is important to control for selection bias here, so as not to pick up variation across policy areas 
in the ability of committee chairs and members to maintain their status. Controlling for committee 
type, or examining time series for a given committee, would help here. 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
The product of this model is a simple theory of delegation, and why it varies by policy 
area. The theory points to three important parameters: the distance in ideal points 
between the agency and the legislature; the cost to the legislature of acquiring exper-
tise through other means; and the cost to the agency of subverting the legislature's 
dictates. 
The model highlights a new, indirect effect of a change in the agent's preferences 
on discretionary authority: its effect on the desire to investigate. It also implies that 
expertise in the bureaucracy is a substitute for expertise elsewhere, not a complement. 
Subversion introduces the intuition that there is selection bias in the agencies that 
receive policy making authority: they are the ones for which subverting legislative 
dictates is not "too easy." Subversion also implies that even a perfectly representative 
legislature will bias policy choices away from the median member of the electorate. 
The equilibrium effect on discretionary grants of lowering subversion cost implies that 
legislatures are actually better off when subversion is relatively (but not extremely) 
cheap. Subversion of a legislature's policy dictates is not the same as subversion of a 
legislature's interests, because even though those dictates are ex ante optimal, ex post 
they may be wrong (from the legislature'S point of view), and the expert bureaucrat 
knows when they are. Agents, by contrast, are better off when subversion is more 
expensive, because the legislature accounts for easy subversion by tightly constraining 
discretion or not delegating at all. 
There are several possible directions for future research. One direction to investi-
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gate is corruption. Delegation of decision making or administrative authority carries 
the danger that different decisions will be made, or will be made on different bases, 
than those desired by the delegator. The representation of subversion in this chapter 
is one way of capturing that. 
Such a direction requires reckoning with other actors besides the legislature and 
the agent, which raises another point about this model. Other actors can at best be 
interpreted as represented through the preferences of L and A, or the parameters b 
and c. It would be interesting to include some of these other actors, like the president 
or courts, in a nontrivial way. 
Since legislatures can take an active role in designing institutions, the problem 
is really one of mechanism design, and this may be a fruitful direction to take this 
research. 16 deFigueiredo, Spiller and Urbiztondo (1999) apply this approach in a 
model of bureaucratic service production. In informational environments like this one, 
identifying the agent's private knowledge of w as the type would allow for analysis of 
optimal incentive schemes to extract that information, and how these schemes change 
with investigation and with the incentive instruments (like limited side payments) 
available to the principal. 
16 z,From this point of view this model is an optimal mechanisms model, where the set of mecha-
nisms open to the principal is all compact, connected regions of the policy space. 
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Appendix A: Investigations and Subversion 
Derivation of Agent's Optimal Policy. If A's ideal outcome can be 
obtained by choosing a policy within the discretionary bounds set by L, A will clearly 
not pay the cost to subvert. This is the case when W E [A-d-q, A-q+d]. Otherwise 
its utility maximizing choice of policy p is equivalent to a choice of subversion level 
s. To see this, suppose that w is relatively small, so that A wants to choose a policy 
larger than any in the discretionary bound set by L to get close to its ideal outcome. 
Then A will choose a policy p = q + d + s, where d and q are taken as given. So A's 
maximization problem in this case is 
maxUA(s) = -(q + d + s + w - A)2 - cs2. 
s 
The first order condition is 
oUA 
- = -2(q + d + s + w - A) - 2cs = 0 os 
which implies that s* = A-~~r-w; the second order condition is c > -1, true by 
assumption. A similar exercise can be performed when w is very large, so that A wants 
to choose a relatively small policy: then p = q - d - s. This yields A's equilibrium 
policy with the possibility of subversion: 
q + d + (A-~~~-W) if w < A - q - d 
A-w ~A-d-q<w<A-q+d 
- d + (A -q+d-w ) if A - q + d < w. q c+l 
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As c ---+ 00 these results collapse to the no-subversion case. • 
Derivation of Optimal Status Quo and Discretion. With subversion ac-
counted for, L's problem with a given posterior w f"V U[z - t, Z + tJ is 
maxEUdd,q) = -(w+q+d+( -q- -w))2dF(w) [
A-q-d A d 
d,q z-t C + 1 
l z+t A - q + d - w + - (w + q - d - ( ) ) 2 dF (w ) A-q+d C + 1 
l A - q+d + -A2dF(w). A-q-d 
Simultaneous solution of first order conditions17 yields the following: 
or 
d* = .1 -A+tc+2c2q+2c2z-Ac2+tc3+( _c2z2_2c2zq_C2q2+A2c2+A2) 1/2 
c c2 +l 
( _c2 z2_2c2 zq_c2q2 +A2c2+A 2) 1/2 c2 
c2 +1 
d* = max{t - A - ~,O}, and 
{ 
- Z - 6. if d > 0 
q* = c 
-z if d = O. 
The special case of c = 00 can be obtained simply by taking the limits of the 
above expressions for d* and q* as c ---+ 00, or by formally analyzing a model in which 
P E [q - d, q + dJ. This yields d* = max{t - A, O} and q* = -z = -Ew .• 
Proof of Proposition 3.1: This requires q* = -z - 6. if d > 0, which follows from the 
c 
above derivation. • 
17Second order conditions are also satisfied. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.2: Since d* = max{t - A - 1,0}, afe' > 0 provided d* > O. 
Further, d* > 0 if and only if c > t!"A' • 
Derivation of Optimal Investigation. L must decide on a level of investigation 
v taking account of the optimal strategies later in the game. Recall that when d = 0, 
x = q + wand the agent exerts no control over policy. 
Assuming nonzero discretion, L's problem (this time suppressing dependence on 
d and q) is 
max EUL(v) 
v l Z(V)+2A+
2
:-t(V) A A 
- -(w + (-z(v) - -) + (t(v) - A - -) 
z(v)-t(v) c c 
+(A - (-z(v) -1) - (t(v) - A -1) - w))2dF(w) 
c+1 
j Z(V)+t(V) + -A2dF(w) - b(v). z(v)+2A+2A~-t(v) 
Let b(v) = 0 if v = 0 and b(v) = b if v = 1 (i.e., L investigates). The probability of 
getting a particular posterior mean is exactly cancelled by the width of the support 
of the posterior (i.e., the inverse of the posterior density in the case of uniform dis-
tributions) given the posterior mean. Thus with d > 0 L's expected utility reduces 
to 
maxEU
L 
= _~A3 (c + 1) _ A2 t(v)c - A - cA _ b(v). 
v 3 t(v)c t(v)c 
This is independent of z, the realized posterior mean. The reason is, whatever signal 
is observed, the status quo choice will adjust the location of A's discretionary window 
so that the actual posterior mean is not relevant. What matters for utility is the 
precision of the posterior belief. 
85 
If no discretion is granted, the expected utility is 
1 1 
112 1 2 11 3)2 ( EUL = - -(w - -) dF(w) - - -(w - - dF w) - b 2 0 4 2 ! 4 
2 
or _..l. - b if v = 1 and 
48 ' 
11 1 2 EUL = -(W - -) dF(w) o 2 
-1
1
2 if v = 0. 
Comparing these expected utilities in case A E (0, ±C~l))' so that authority is 
always delegated regardless of v, v = 1 if and only if 
4A3 1 2 1 A 2A3 1 2 1 A 
--(1 + -) - 4A (- - A - -) - b ~ --(1 + -) - 2A (- - A --) 
3 c 4 c 3 c 2 c 
If A is such that A E (±C~l)' ~C~1))' or delegation occurs only in case v = 0, it 
will investigate if and only if 
1 2A3 1 2 1 A 
-- - b ~ --(1 + -) - 2A (- - A --) 
48 3 c 2 c 
Finally, if A ~ ~ C~l)' L can again investigate but discretion is never granted. 
v = 1 if and only if - }8 - b ~ - 112' or b ~ l~. 
The results for c = 00 follow from limc-too C~l = 1. • 
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Proof of Proposition 3.3: The result is immediate from a combination of the facts 
that A E (tC~l)' ~C~l)) receive nonzero discretion if and only if v = 0, A E 
(0, :t C~l)) receives more discretion when v = 0, and the comparative static that 
higher values of b result in less investigation. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4: :! 
A E (i C~ 1 ), ~ C~ 1 ) ). 
• 
2A - 4A 2 (1 + ~) > ° for 
• 
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Appendix B: Preferences over Subversion Cost 
For the results on preferences over c, fix v = 0 and b = 00 and note that only 
when c> .5~A does the agent get a chance to influence policy; if c ::::; .5~A' X = q + w. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5: Fix A and consider L's equilibrium utility. First note that 
when c> l~A' L is better off the smaller is c. In this case, L's expected utility is 
2 
The first derivat!ve of this expression in c is - ~~:, which is always negative. Thus, 
as c gets larger, evidently L's utility gets smaller. Furthermore, &;::a~L < 0 as well. 
It must also be shown (because of the discontinuity in payoffs at c = .5~A) that 
L prefers c > .5~A to c ::::; .5~A' Again, expected utility when v = 0 and c ::::; .5~A is 
r1 -(w - 1)2dF(w) = _l Then it remains to show _~A3 (c+1) _ 2A2 .5c-A-cA > _l J 0 2 12 . 3 c c 12 
whenever c > .5~A' But this is obvious because in such a case, it has been shown 
(Appendix A) that L's utility maximizing choice is to grant some discretion: if - /2 
were better for L, it would have taken it. • 
Proof of Proposition 3.6: Consider A's preferences over c. When c > .5~A' A's ex-
pected utility in equilibrium is 
12A+2: 1 A 1 A A + .1 + A + .1 - w {-(w + (-- - -) + (- - A - -) + (c C) _ A)2 o 2 c 2 c c+l 
A+.1+A+.1-w 
-c( c c + 1 c )2}dw, 
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or _~A3C2+X+1. Conditional on nonzero discretion being granted, the first derivat.ive 
of A's equilibrium expected utility in c is a~~A = 136 A3c~1 > o. Thus, as long as there 
is some discretion granted, A's utility is growing in c. Note also that a;~~A > O. 
It must also be the case that a given A is better off for some c that is sufficiently 
large to induce discretion. For purposes of this proof focus on c -+ 00, which is 
sufficient for the result. Now when c ~ .5~A and no policy authority is granted, A's 
expected utility is 
11 1 EUA = 0 -(w - "2 - A)2dw, 
or - /2 - A2. Comparing this to the agent's utility with some discretion granted and 
c = 00 first note that lim _§.A3C2+2c+l = -§.A3 Then it remains to show that 
, c-+oo 3 c2 3· 
_~A3 > -1~ - A2 , which is true as long as A E (0, ~), but any relevant A must be in 
this interval in the first place (A's outside it get no discretionary authority). • 
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Chapter 4 An Experimental Comparison of 
Mechanisms for the Provision of Excludable 
Public Goods 
90 
Abstract 
This chapter compares three collective choice procedures for the provision of exclud-
able public goods under incomplete information. One, serial cost sharing (SCS), is 
budget balanced, individually rational, anonymous, and strategy proof. The other 
two are "hybrid" procedures: voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCS) 
and with no rebates (NR). PCS satisfies all these properties except strategy proofness, 
and NR satisfies all the properties except for strategy proofness and budget balance. 
However, PCS and NR do not exclude any potential users, and they do not require 
equal cost shares, thereby overcoming the two main sources of inefficiency with SCS. 
I characterize the Bayesian Nash equilibria of the hybrid mechanisms and conduct 
laboratory experiments to compare the performance of the three mechanisms. I find 
that PCS produces significantly more efficient allocations than either SCS or NR. 
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4.1 Introduction 
For the last several decades, economists have grappled with the question of how 
to design mechanisms for the efficient production and cost-sharing of public goods. 
Nearly all of the energy has been directed toward the case of pure, nonexcludable 
public goods. While the reasons for focusing on that kind of public good are historical 
and well rooted in the traditional literature following Samuelson (1954), it is not at all 
clear that this is the most typical case in practice. Many public goods are excludable. 
Even the classic examples like lighthouses, parks, and security can, in principle (and 
often do, in practice), exclude some users. 
Recently there has been an upsurge of interest in the design of mechanisms for 
excludable public goods. 1 These mechanisms focus largely on cost-sharing schemes 
which divide the consumers into users and non-users, and then have a formula for 
dividing the costs among the users. In some cases, the extra degree of freedom to 
exclude can be efficiency enhancing since the threat of exclusion can relax incentive 
and/or participation constraints. But this comes with a cost. The very act of exclu-
sian creates inefficiencies in a very direct way, which I call exclusionary inefficiency. 
Once a public good is provided, it is costless to allow extra users, so it is inefficient to 
exclude. 2 A subset of the mechanisms for production and cost sharing of excludable 
public goods are all those mechanisms that exclude nobody. In mechanisms of this 
sort, there is no exclusionary inefficiency. 
lSee, for example, Moulin (1994), Deb and Razzolini (1999), Chen and Khoroshilov (1999), Chen 
(2000), Dorsey and Razzolini (2000), and Norman (2000). 
2This is true for nonrival public goods. In case of crowding or other sorts of user externalities, 
the inefficiencies created by exclusion are less severe, and exclusion can even be efficiency enhancing. 
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In this chapter I report on experiments for the provision of excludable threshold 
public goods, and compare a widely acclaimed exclusionary cost-sharing mechanism, 
serial cost-sharing, with two very simple nonexclusionary rules. I consider a public 
good technology where, if a certain threshold of contributions is met, the good is 
produced and may be consumed at no extra cost to any subset of the group; the good 
is not produced if the threshold is not met. Consumers have private valuations of the 
public good, and there is incomplete information about these preferences. 
Serial cost sharing (SCS)3 is now quite familiar in the literature on excludable 
public goods (Moulin 1994, Deb and Razzolini 1999), and is related to the serial cost 
sharing mechanism for private goods (Moulin and Shenker 1992). The mechanism is 
strategy proof, balanced, and individually rational. The two nonexclusionary mecha-
nisms are voluntary cost sharing with proportional rebates (PCS) and with no rebates 
(NR) of any contributions beyond the threshold. These are "hybrid" mechanisms. 
NR can be viewed as an anonymous, individually rational base mechanism, to which 
PCS adds budget balance. None of the three mechanisms are fully efficient. 
I characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria in pes and NR, and establish 
several properties, including monotonicity of the bidding functions. Both mechanisms 
typically have multiple equilibria, in contrast to many auction mechanisms for public 
goods with independent private valuations. Each set includes some equilibrium allo-
cation rules that are more efficient (and some that are less efficient) than the strategy 
proof allocation rule under SCS. The laboratory experiments provide information 
3More specifically, the Direct Serial Mechanism to represent the serial formula (see Moulin 1994). 
My terminology follows Moulin's. 
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about the ability of these procedures to select "desirable" equilibria, and about how 
resulting collective choices compare on welfare grounds with those under SCS. 
The experiments find systematic differences between these procedures, in terms of 
both the individual and the collective behavior they induce. The dominant strategy 
equilibrium in SCS explains individual behavior very well. PCS induced significantly 
higher bidding than NR. Overbidding (i.e., bidding above value) was fairly common 
- more common than I anticipated - in PCS, but it was rarely observed in NR. 
Learning does not appear to have much effect on subject behavior within a given 
procedure, in the sense that there is only minimal evidence of trends in bidding 
behavior. An alternative hypothesis, risk aversion, is one possible explanation for the 
overbidding. 
PCS extracts more consumer surplus than SCS and makes efficient decisions more 
often. Unlike SCS, PCS is not strategy proof, but it overcomes the two main sources 
of inefficiency in SCS: it never excludes any potential users of the public good, and it 
allows unequal cost shares so high value users can subsidize low value ones. Further-
more, NR, which is neither strategy proof nor budget balanced, also overcomes these 
difficulties. The comparison between NR and SCS is more subtle since NR is not 
balanced. SCS delivers more consumer surplus and leads to ex post efficient decisions 
more often than NR. However, NR does substantially better when total rather than 
gross surplus (i.e., including overcontributions) is the welfare criterion. In fact, if 
the unrebated overcontributions are not subtracted in the surplus calculation, NR is 
comparable to SCS in extracting available surplus. Both are outperformed by PCS. 
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There are three previous experimental studies of SCS. Chen and Khoroshilov 
(1999) and Chen (2000) report on some experiments with serial cost sharing. They 
focus on serial cost sharing and average cost pricing in complete information environ-
ments, and in environments with limited information (e.g., subjects observe their own 
action and payoff, but not the game form or other subjects' choices or payoffs). They 
emphasize learning in these mechanisms. Dorsey and Razzolini (2000) study SCS 
experimentally. In contrast to these results they find that SCS performs relatively 
well on efficiency grounds. One reason for this is that they use a continuous public 
good technology, whereas in these experiments it is discrete. Thus in applications of 
SCS a benevolent mechanism designer may want to pay attention to the public good 
technology, even though the incentive properties of SCS are the same in both cases. 
It would be interesting to know whether this effect of the technology on the efficiency 
of SCS is robust. 
This chapter is also related to the interdisciplinary body of experimental work 
on threshold or step-level public goods, where the level of the public good consumed 
is positive if and only if contributions exceed some threshold (e.g., Bagnoli and Mc-
Kee 1991; Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker 1988; Marwell and Ames 1979, 1980; Palfrey 
and Rosenthal 1991; Rapoport 1985, 1987, 1988; Rapoport and Eshed-Levy 1989; 
Rapoport and Suleiman 1993). Unlike these experiments, however, these papers typ-
ically focus on variants of the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism under complete in-
formation, and often on all-or-nothing contributions. Sulciman and Rapoport (1992) 
study continuous contributions when return from public good is independent of total 
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contributions (provided they exceed the threshold), an environment closely related 
to the present one for PCS and NR. They focus (like Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker 
1988) on the effect changes in the threshold have on contributions and the proba-
bility of public good provision. They find (again like Isaac, Schmidtz, and Walker 
1988) that higher thresholds lead to higher contributions but lower probability of pro-
vision. Cadsby and Maynes (1998) study continuous contributions under complete 
information; in one treatment contributions may be refunded if the threshold is not 
met (similar to NR; see also the Provision Point Mechanism in Bagnoli and McKee 
1991). This "money back guarantee" increases contributions relative to the case when 
contributions are lost even if the threshold is not met. 
Dawes, Orbell, Simmons, and van de Kragt (1986) examine all-or-nothing contri-
bution, and rebates. Consistent with some of my findings with finer grained contri-
butions in PCS and NR, they find that rebates (their "no fear" condition) increase 
contributions. Marks and Croson (1998) study mechanisms like PCS and NR with 
continuous contributions under complete information, in addition to a mechanism 
where surplus contributions finance a continuous public good. They find that Nash 
outcomes are more common under the No Rebate procedure, and that rebates signifi-
cantly affect the variance of contributions. Both of these mechanisms are analogous to 
auctions in private good environments. In fact, the public good environments in this 
chapter are isomorphic to private good environments with fixed costs, zero marginal 
costs, and no capacity constraint. 
Auction-like procedures, similar to PCS and NR, have also been experimentally 
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examined by Smith (1979a, 1979b, 1980); Ferejohn, Forsythe, and Noll (1979); and 
Ferejohn, Forsythe, Noll, and Palfrey (1982). Smith compares the performance of 
institutional rules that vary individual incentives. In these "auction mechanisms" 
agents submit bids for how much they want of one public good or a menu of public 
projects and cost shares they will accept. If all agents agree on a quantity and cost 
share, that is the outcome; otherwise the public good is not produced. In Ferejohn, 
Forsythe, and Noll and Ferejohn, Forsythe, Noll, and Palfrey, groups had to select 
several public projects to produce and decide how to split costs; different members 
had different values and budgets. The collective choice procedures involved features 
of voting rules, auctions, and rebates. 
Van Dijk and Grodzka (1992) study threshold public good provision with limited 
information about asymmetric endowments. They focus on subject evaluations of the 
equity of contributions. They do not study the effects of incomplete information in 
the game theoretic sense or try to control beliefs about the information asymmetry. 
Croson and Marks (1999) study the PPM (examined in Bagnoli and McKee 1991 
under complete information), an all-or-nothing contribution procedure, under incom-
plete information. They find no significant differences in the likelihood of successful 
provision under complete and incomplete information. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the environment, 
equilibrium, and some key properties of collective choice procedures. In Section 3 I 
develop and review some theoretical results on the mechanisms I test. In Section 4 I 
cover some properties of these mechanisms specific to the experimental parameters. 
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In Section 5 I describe the design of the experiments. Section 6 discusses results 
from the experiments. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are contained in Appendix A; 
instructions from the experiment are in Appendix B. 
4.2 The Model 
A group of individuals must decide whether to produce and how to share the cost 
of an excludable public good. There are n players, output of the public good, g, 
is either 0 or 1. The cost function is C(l) = C > 0 and C(O) = o. The set of 
possible valuations for player i, denoted V, is a finite set of real numbers, and is 
the same for all players. I use Vi to denote i's valuation, and v = (Vl' ... , vn) E vn 
denotes a profile of valuations. Player i knows Vi, but does not know Vj for j -# i. 
Values are independently and identically distributed across the players, according 
to the probability distribution function, p, which is common knowledge among the 
players. I assume that max{V} < C, and that for some profile v, L:i Vi ~ C. The 
set of feasible outcomes is A = {g,sl, ... ,Sn,Xl, ... ,xnlg E {O,l},si ~ 0 Vi, L:i Si ~ 
C(g), 0 ~ Xi ~ g} where Si is i's share of C(g). Player i's utility of an outcome 
a = (g, Sl, ... , Sn, Xl, ... , xn), is given by Ui(a) = ViXi - Si. I call 9 the public good 
decision, Si is i's cost share, and Xi is i's public good allocation. 
A collective choice procedure is simply a mechanism or game form, (B, f), where 
B = Bl X .•• x Bn is the message space and f : B -+ A is the outcome function. The 
outcome function f has three components, f = (G, S, X). 
Definition 4.1 A direct mechanism is one where B =: V. 
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Definition 4.2 A strategy for player i is a function bi : Vi -----7 Bi . A strategy profile 
b( v) = ( bI (VI)' ... , bn (vn )) is one strategy for each player. 
Definition 4.3 The real valued function bi( Vi) is weakly monotone if Vi > v~ implies 
bi(Vi) ~ bi(vD. It is strictly monotone if Vi > v~ implies bi(Vi) > bi(vD. 
When player i has valuation Vi his payoff function in the game induced by the 
mechanism is: 
Let V-i be all elements of V besides Vi, and similarly for b_i(v-i). 
Definition 4.4 A pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (ENE) is a strategy pro-
file b(·) such that bie) E argmaxb;EBi LV_i p(v-ilvi)Ui((b~, b_i(v-i)), v) Vi. 
Definition 4.5 An equilibrium, b, is symmetric if for every v' E v, bi(v') = bj(v') = 
b(v'), Vi, j. 
Definition 4.6 An equilibrium, b, is trivial if G(b(v)) = 0 for all v. 
Definition 4.7 A strategy bi for player i is ex post weakly dominated if there exists 
a b~ such that for all value profiles v, ui((b~, b-;(V-i)), v) ~ ui((bi , b_i(v-i)), v) for all 
b_i(v-i) with strict inequality for some b_i(v-i) and some v. 
Thus when i knows all other values, bi is never better than, and sometimes strictly 
worse than, b~, no matter what players other than i do. Ex post weak domination 
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implies weak domination at the interim stage, when i knows Vi but not V~i (as in the 
experiments), and at the ex ante stage, when i knows neither her own value nor those 
of any other players, but only the prior on v. 
Let ZT be the components of a vector belonging to a set T. 
Definition 4.8 A direct mechanism is ex post coalition strategy proof if for any 
M ~ N, any value profile v E Il~=l V, and any profile of messages (fJ M, fJM\N) E 
Il~=l V, #{Ui((fJM,fJM\N),V) > ui((vM,fJM\N),v)forsomei E M} < #{Uj((fJM,fJM\N),v) < 
Uj((v M, fJM\N), v) for some j EM}. 
Thus if any subset M of N (including the singleton i) could coordinate a deviation 
from the truth, more members of M are worse off than better off, regardless of what 
k E M\N does. 
Definition 4.9 A mechanism is ex post individually rational ifui(b(v),v) ~ 0 Vv E 
V, Vi. 
Definition 4.10 A mechanism is anonymous if at any value profile v such that Vi = 
Definition 4.11 A mechanism is budget balanced if 2::i Si(bi) = C, Vbi . 
One of my purposes is to compare the welfare properties of the various mecha-
nisms. I define two measures here. 
Definition 4.12 The consumer surplus of an outcome for the group N is (2::i ViXi -
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Definition 4.13 The total surplus of an outcome for the group N is (Li 'ViXi - gC). 
4.3 Properties of SCS, PCS, and NR 
In this section I review some properties of ses. I also present some results on pes 
and NR, and in particular properties of their sets of equilibria. 
4.3.1 Serial Cost Sharing 
With excludable public goods there are several ways to express the serial cost sharing 
formula (Moulin 1994). I focus on the direct serial mechanism associated with ses. 
Represented in this way ses has the attractive features of coalition strategy proofness, 
a strengthening of individual rationality, anonymity, and budget balance. 
Each agent is asked to report an element of V. Without loss of generality, suppose 
Dl ~ D2 ~ ... ~ Dn are the declared valuations. If I:i Di < C, the public good is not 
prod uced and all agents i E N pay 5 i ( i)) = o. If Li Vi ~ C, and there is an integer k 
such that Vk ~ f' then the public good is produced. Furthermore, if k* is the largest 
integer such that Vk ~ f, then agents j E {I, 2, ... , k*} each consume the public good 
and all pay 5 j (v) = ;., while other agents i E {k* + 1, ... , n} do not consume the good 
and pay 5 i (v) = o. If I:i Vi ~ C but there is not an integer k such that Vk ~ f' the 
good is not produced and all agents i E N pay 5i (v) = O. Note that an individual's 
payment is not affected by declarations of valuation higher than her own. This is an 
important component of the incentive scheme generated by this mechanism. Some 
important properties of ses are listed in the following theorem. 
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Proposition 4.1 (Moulin 1994, Theorem 2) SGS is ex post coalition strategy proof, 
ex post individually rational, budget balanced, and anonymous. 
This mechanism achieves budget balance in dominant strategies, so obviously it 
must not be efficient (c.f. Green and Laffont 1977) except in special uninteresting 
cases. In particular, to achieve incentive compatibility it exploits excludability of 
the public good: some agents are excluded from consumption of the public good in 
equilibrium. That is, for some agents and some profiles of reports, Xi(b) < G(b). 
When Vi > 0 this is ex post inefficient. A feature that leads indirectly to ex post 
inefficiency is that among the group members who consume the same amount of the 
public good, costs for that quantity of the good are shared equally. With a binary 
public good, then, all consumers must share costs equally. Thus the mechanism 
cannot take advantage of a relatively high valuation to balance a relatively low one. 
For example, in a three person group, if the sum of all three valuations is higher than 
the cost, but none is higher than half the cost and one is less than a third of the cost, 
the ses mechanism will not produce the good, even though by construction it would 
be efficient to do so. 
4.3.2 Proportional Cost Sharing (PCS) 
In pes, agents submit bids and share the cost of the public good only if the sum 
of all bids is greater than the cost of the good. This mechanism, like ses, is indi-
vidually rational, anonymous, and balances the budget. However, it is not strategy 
proof. Nevertheless, it has two potential advantages over ses. First, it never excludes 
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anyone from consuming the public good, even though exclusion is feasible. Second, it 
allows for different agents to have different cost shares. This permits high valuation 
consumers to subsidize the consumption of low valuation consumers. 
Agents submit real number bids from 0 to C. 4 If Lj bJ ;? C the good is consumed 
by all agents, and consumed by no agents otherwise. Agent i's cost share is 
if Lj bj :? C 
if Lj bj < C 
Notice, therefore, that by construction, Li Si = C if the good is produced, so pes is 
budget balanced. Individual rationality and anonymity are similarly obvious. 
There can be multiple Bayesian equilibria, and the set depends on the distribu-
tion of values and the production cost. The first result is that none of the involve 
overbidding (bidding above valuation), and indeed this is dominated. 
Proposition 4.2 (No overbidding) Any strategy in which bi(Vi) > Vi for some Vi zs 
ex post weakly dominated in the PCS mechanism. 
z bids bi the good is produced, given the bid functions of the other players. Let 
the following lemma. Note that since valuations are strictly bounded above by C, the 
proposition above implies that bi < C for all i in any BNE. 
4In the experiments agents submit integer bids from 0 to C. This does not affect the theoretical 
results. 
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Lemma 4.1 (Cost Share Monotonicity) If Pi (bi ) > 0 and bi < C, Si(bi) is strictly 
increasing at bi' 
Proposition 4.3 (Bid Monotonicity)Let b*(v) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid-
ding function in PCS. If Pi(b*(v)) > 0 for all v > min{V}, then, for all Vi, Vj, 
4.3.3 Cost Sharing with No Rebates (NR) 
Cost Sharing with No Rebates is the same as Proportional Cost Sharing except excess 
contributions are not rebated. If the good is produced, then everyone simply pays 
their bid. Therefore it is individually rational and anonymous. Like PCS, it never 
excludes anyone, and it allows unequal cost shares, so high value users can subsidize 
low value users. 
Formally, each agent i submits a real number bid, bi , from 0 to C. If '2: j bj ~ C 
the good is consumed by all agents, and consumed by no agents otherwise. Agent i's 
cost share is 
Therefore, if the good is produced, each agent simply pays its bid. 
The equilibrium set for NR bears some similarities to that of PCS. 
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Proposition 4.4 (No overbidding) Any strategy in which bi(Vi) > Vi for some Vi is 
ex post weakly dominated in the NR mechanism. 
Proposition 4.5 (Bid Monotonicity)Let b* (v) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium bid-
ding function in NR. If Pi(b*(v)) > 0 for all v > min{V}, then, for all Vi, Vj, 
Vi > Vj => b*(Vi) 2:: b*(Vj). 
The proofs of these two propositions are the same as for the analogous propositions in 
the previous section. Ex post weak dominance only required a si(bi ) such that ~ > 0 
when Lj bj ~ C and L#i bj > 0 , and Lemma 1 required for weak monotonicity is 
also true for NR. 
4.4 Experimental Parameters 
In the laboratory experiments, I use 3 person groups, with cost C = 102 and each 
Vi is independently drawn from a uniform distribution over a set of three possible 
values, Vi = {29, 45, 90}, i = 1,2,3. The valuations were chosen in a way that 
allows the possibility of systematically different equilibrium behavior across the three 
mechanisms I wish to compare. Additional details of the experimental design are 
given in the next section. Let < A, B, C > denote the profile of values A, B, C and 
all its permutations. 
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4.4.1 Equilibria in SCS 
SCS has multiple equilibria under the parameters in this chapter. All but one of these 
are trivial and the one remaining is in weakly dominant strategies. For example, if 
all agents but one always claim to have v = 29, the remaining agent cannot gain by 
claiming otherwise. The unique nontrivial SCS equilibrium entails truthful revelation 
by each bidder. It will produce the public good for at least some group members 
in the profiles < 90,90,90 >, < 90,90,45 >, < 90,45,45 >, < 45,45,45 >, and 
< 90,90,29 >. Only the last of these involves exclusion, and hence fails to realize 
all available surplus in the profile. The unique SCS equilibrium makes the efficient 
decision (in the sense of producing when the sum of values is at least 102) in 12 of 
27 equally likely value profiles. Three of these 12 involve exclusion, so in nine of 27 
profiles, the weakly dominant SCS equilibrium is fully efficient. 
If VI E [2f, CJ, V2 E [~, fJ, and V3 E [0, ~J where Vi is the ith highest value, the 
good is never produced even though it is always efficient to do so. Only one person 
is willing to share up to ~ the cost, and only two people are willing to share up to t. 
In the experiment all three group members have an equal chance of drawing a value 
from one of these three regions. All three possible values used in the experiment are 
near the upper bound of their respective intervals, making the size of the lost surplus 
relatively large, in the probability ~ event that each one of these regions is represented 
in a given group. 
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4.4.2 Equilibria in pes and NR 
Consider a symmetric bid function b = {bL , bM , bH } where v = 29 bids bL , v = 45 bids 
bM , and v = 90 bids bH . The following propositions ensure that weak monotonicity 
of bids applies in symmetric equilibria for both PCS and NR in this environment. 5 
Proposition 4.6 In PCS, P(bL ), P(bM ), and P(bH ) aTe strictly positive in any non-
tTivial symmetric equilibrium. 
Proposition 4.7 In NR, P(bM ) and P(bII ) are strictly positive in any nontrivial 
symmetTic equilibrium. 
The proof is the first paragraph of that for the pes analogue. Unlike for PCS, 
P(bL ) = 0 is possible in a nontrivial symmetric equilibrium in NR: {O, 34, 34} is an 
example. 
No player will overbid in equilibrium in a profile that leads to production with 
positive probability. This fact, weak monotonicity, and the following proposition 
greatly aided the search for Bayesian Nash equilibria. 
Proposition 4.8 Consider a symmetric profile of bid functions b = {bL , bM , bH } in 
PCS or NR. If player i with value Vi has any interim profitable deviation from bV , 
then one of the following deviations is profitable: d = 0 or d = 102 - x - y for some 
x,y E b. 
5r only consider symmetric equilibria. 
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Given the experimental treatment, I limited attention in PCS and NR to integer 
valued bid functions. I further restricted attention to pure strategy (and symmetric) 
equilibria.6 Given the restriction to integer-valued bid functions, a numerical search 
for equilibria was most efficient. For each weakly monotone, integer valued, pure 
bid function with no overbidding, I checked each possible test deviations identified in 
Proposition 4.8. 
A family of trivial symmetric pure strategy ENE under the experimental param-
eters exists with the bid function 
b, ~ { if Vi = 29 m if Vi = 45 
h if Vi = 90 
where 0 ~ l ~ 6, 0 ~ m ~ 6, and 0 ~ h ~ 6. 
Under PCS, there are four categories of equilibria. These four categories can 
be ranked by efficiency, as measured by total surplus. Within each category, the 
set of profiles at which the good is produced is the same. The most efficient group 
contains four equilibria,7 all of which involve some pooling. 17 ENE fall into the 
second most efficient class; the remaining 40 fall into the third most efficient group. 
The multiplicity of equilibria in a given category simply corresponds to different 
equilibrium cost shares for the same allocations. The fourth category produces 
6This only restricts the class of equilibria I consider. All equilibria I find are equilibria with 
respect to the set of all integer valued bid functions. 
Focusing on symmetric equilibria for experimental purposes is not limiting, since subject matching 
precluded coordination on asymmetric equilibria. 
7 {21, 21, 60}, {22, 22, 58}, {23, 23, 56}, and {24, 24, 54}, where {X, Y, Z} denotes the bid of type 
29, 45, and 90 respectively. 
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for exactJy the same set of profiles as in SCS, and includes the least efficient PCS 
equilibria. The set of all symmetric PCS equilibria is graphed in Figure 4.1. 
For NR (Figure 4.2), 35 equilibria are nontrivial; only four of these8 are more effi-
cient than the undominated SCS equilibrium.9 Table 4.1 shows production decisions 
by profile for SCS, the three better categories of PCS equilibria, and the best NR 
equilibria. 
Table 4.1: Production decisions at each profile, by equilibrium class 
4.4.3 Ex Post Efficiency of equilibria in SCS, PCS, and NR 
From the derivation above, with these parameters the most efficient NR equilibrium 
is as efficient as the second most efficient PCS equilibrium. The most efficient and 
second most efficient equilibrium under PCS produces higher expected surplus than 
the SCS dominant strategy equilibrium. The remaining 31 nontrivial, integer valued, 
symmetric, pure BNE in NR are strictly less efficient than the SCS equilibrium. 
8{23,34,45}, {24,34,44}, {25,35,42}, and {26,35,41}. 
9Equilibriurn sets in pes and NR are strictly non-nested. 
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4.4.4 Ex Ante Efficiency of equilibria In SCS, PCS, and NR 
An allocation rule is ex ante efficient and individually rational if there does not exist 
another individually rational and feasible allocation rule that is a Bayesian equilib-
rium of some mechanism that ex ante Pareto dominates it. From results in Ledyard 
and Palfrey (1999a) ex ante efficiency implies no exclusion in this experimental envi-
ronment. Full characterization of interim efficient allocation rules, of which ex ante 
efficient allocation rules are a special case, can be found in Ledyard and Palfrey 
(1999a). 
In these environments ex ante efficiency entails production at all profiles except 
< 29,29,29 >. I show that none of the three rules I study here are ex ante efficient. 
However, the departure from first best efficiency is quite small in the second best 
mechanism. Further, the best equilibria of PCS are 95.02% ex ante efficient; the 
best equilibria from NR are 88.79% ex ante efficient; and the dominant strategy SCS 
equilibrium is 61.57% ex ante efficient. 
Proposition 4.9 No allocation rule is ex ante efficient. 
Under these parameters, the best a welfare maximizing principal can do subject to 
incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and feasibility is produce at all profiles 
except < 29,29,29 > and < 29,29,45 >. This is implementable according to the 
profile-contingent payments in Table 4.2. 
A principal could present the agents with this table, and they would willingly report 
their valuations. The expected taxes satisfy incentive compatibility and individual 
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Payments 
/I Own type 
29 I 45 90 
Table 4.2: Profile contingent payments in the second-best allocation rule 
rationality: t 29 = ~(29), t 45 = 29.333, and t90 = 39.333. They also satisfy feasibility: 
4.4.5 Hypotheses 
Based on the previous equilibrium results, I formulated the hypotheses in Tables 4.3 
and 4.4. The first three deal with individual-level behavior; the second three cover 
collective welfare properties. All are based on the assumption of equilibrium behavior. 
Table 4.3: Hypotheses about individual behavior 
Table 4.4: Hypotheses about collective behavior 
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Hypothesis 2 seemed reasonable because relative to NR, PCS lowers the cost 
of high bids. NR has equilibria where subjects bid more than PCS, but we had no 
reason to believe such equilibria would be selected. 
In view of the multiple equilibria in PCS, Hypothesis 4 and the assumption 
of equilibrium behavior imply a statement about equilibrium selection. Given the 
large number to choose from, I believed subjects would be able to coordinate on 
PCS equilibria more efficient than the undominated SCS equilibrium. I wish to avoid 
Pareto efficiency as a precise equilibrium selection device, while still maintaining that 
higher surplus equilibria should be "focal." 
Given the equilibrium sets for these parameters, I conjectured that NR may not 
outperform SCS on efficiency grounds, since NR has fewer equilibria that are more 
efficienct than the SCS equilibrium. Therefore I view Hypothesis 5 as less likely to 
be borne out in the data, compared to Hypothesis 4. 
NR's most efficient equilibria are as efficient, in terms of likelihood of production 
and surplus extraction, as PCS's second-most efficient equilibria. Hypothesis 6 
implies that I did not expect NR to be systematically better than PCS at inducing 
coordination on its most efficient equilibria. 
4.5 Experimental Design 
To test the hypotheses, I conducted seven sessions of the experiment in the Social 
Science Experimental Laboratory at Caltech. Each session had two parts, with the 
two parts using different mechanisms, and each part repeated over 10 rounds. Subjects 
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for most sessions were students at Pasadena City College (PCC), but for one session, 
the first SCS-PCS session, they were undergraduates at Caltech. All PCC sessions 
had nine subjects. The Caltech session had 12 subjects. Subjects participated in each 
mechanism for 10 rounds, where a round consisted of one decision by each subject 
and a resulting collective decision on public good consumption for the group. This 
information is summarized in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: Experiment design 
Instructions were read aloud to the subjects at the beginning of the experiment 
to ensure public knowledge of the procedures. In addition, for each mechanism there 
were two practice rounds10 to familiarize subjects with the procedures. At the hegin-
ning of each round, subjects were randomly matched into groups of three as follows: 
numbered ping pong balls were placed in a box and shuffled in plain sight of the 
subjects. Three ping pong balls were drawn from the box, and the subjects whose 
numbers were on the balls constituted group 1. This process was repeated (without 
replacement) to draw the remaining groups in each round. Subjects did not know the 
other members of their group in any round; they only knew that they were randomly 
re-matched after every decision. 
lOExcept for the two sessions with NR run second, where one practice round with that mechanism 
was sufficient for subjects to understand it. 
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An experimenter then went from subject to subject to have each one independently 
throw a six sided die to determine his or her valuation for the round. ll A roll of 1 
or 2 meant Vi = 29; a roll of 3 or 4 meant Vi = 45; and 5 or 6 meant Vi = 90. 
Subjects each then decided what to bid for the round and recorded the decision on 
the decision/record sheet. In SCS, subjects could bid either Low, Medium, or High, 
meaning a willingness to share none, ~, or ~ of the cost C = 102, respectively. In PCS 
and NR, subjects could bid any integer between 0 and the cost C = 102. When all 
decisions were made an experimenter collected the sheets. For each group, decisions 
on whether the public good was produced and who consumed it were made according 
to the rules of the mechanism being played. For the SCS experiments, these were as 
in Table 4.6. 
I # H msgs. I # M msgs. I # L msgs. I Produce? I # Users I Cost share I 
3 ~ lL Y t;::) 0 _04 
:2 1 U Y t;::l 3 34 
1 ~ ~ yI:;~ ~ 34 
U 0 U Y t;::) 0 34 
~ U 1 Y I:;::l ~ 51 
1 1 1 NU 0 -
1 U ~ NU U -
0 :L 1 NO 0 -
_0 ! :L }'\JU Q -
u U 3 NU U -
Table 4.6: Messages, collective decisions, and cost shares: SCS 
For PCS and NR, the rules were the ones described in Section 2 above. The exper-
imenter returned the sheets to the subjects, and the next round proceeded in this 
same way. More details are available in the instructions (see Appendix B). 
llThe subjects were separated by privacy partitions, so that the outcome of their roll of the die 
was not observable to any other subject. 
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4.6 Results 
In this section I discuss the results of the experiments, both in terms of the decision 
making behavior within each mechanism, and in terms of the performance of each 
mechanism on welfare grounds. 
4.6.1 Individuals: Bidding Behavior 
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 display the CDFs of bids under each mechanism for v = 29, 
45, and 90 respectively. The CDFs for SCS were computed by mapping a message of 
L, M, or H in that mechanism to a bid of 0, 34, and 51 respectively. Since these are 
the implied cost sharing offers for each message in that mechanism, this is the most 
straightforward way to compare SCS directly with NR and PCS. 12 
These CDFs reveal important differences in behavior in these procedures. For 
v = 29, both NR and PCS induce higher bidding than SCS. Over 85% of bidders in 
SCS were willing to share none of the cost (rather than ~ or ~), while in PCS and NR 
virtually all bidders were willing to share some of the cost. In PCS approximately 
80% of bidders, and in NR 70% of bidders, were willing to share 20 units or more 
of the cost when v = 29. For v = 45, only about 15% of bidders in SCS are willing 
to share more than ~ of the cost or 34 units; in PCS about 65% and in NR about 
35% were willing to share more than ~ (though for NR only about 15% were willing 
to share more than 35 units). In SCS no bidder can share more than ~ of the cost, 
and for v = 90 in SCS 86% of bidders are willing to share this much. About 50% of 
12Because any 1 to 1 correspondence from messages to bids can be used, it also makes sense to 
speak of "truthful" bids in SCS. 
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bidders in pes and about 30% in NR are willing to share more than ~ the cost. 
Bidding behavior in SCS: A quantal response explanation for disequilib-
rium bids 
The weakly dominant equilibrium in ses does a good job of explaining subject be-
havior, in accordance with Hypothesis 1. Table 4.7 presents the empirical proportions 
of time a subject made each bid, conditional on value. The figures are aggregated over 
all three sessions of ses. Thus, conditional on v = 29, 85.1 % of bids were truthful. 
I bid/value I 29 I 45 I 90 I 
Table 4.7: Empirical ses bids, proportions 
Nevertheless, Nash equilibrium (weakly dominant or otherwise) does leave some be-
havior unexplained in ses. A model of eqUilibrium errors may add some explanatory 
power. Quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1996, 1998) is a 
statistical version of Nash equilibrium, in which players sometimes choose subopti-
mal strategies. The likelihood of choosing a strategy is monotonic and continuous 
in the expected utility of the strategy. Therefore, the theory predicts that low-cost 
errors are more likely to occur than high-cost errors. Table 4.8 lists cost of deviating 
from the dominant Nash equilibrium (Le., larger positive numbers imply more costly 
behavior), given the empirical bidding frequencies from Table 4.7. 
Thus, for 29 bidders in the ses mechanism, the optimal strategy is to announce 
L, while announcing M is a low cost error and H is a high cost error. For the 45 
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Table 4.8: Expected cost of deviating from expected bid function, based on empirical 
bid frequencies 
bidders, announcing L is the low cost error, and for 90 bidders, announcing M is the 
low cost error. This is consistent with the data, except for the 45 bidders, where the 
cost of Land H deviations are nearly the same. 
Comparing bids under PCS and NR 
It is evident from Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 that for each value, NR tends to lower bids 
relative to PCS, though this effect looks weaker for v = 29. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
(2 tailed) for difference in distribution support these interpretations and, generally, 
Hypothesis 2. For v = 45 and 90, the differences due to the mechanism are large and 
significant. For v = 29, the difference is insignificant at the 0: = .10 level. Table 4.9 
displays the observed max IFpcs(b) -FNR(b)/ for each value (where FA (b) is the CDF 
for the given value of mechanism A) and the critical values for 0: = .10 and .001 (see 
Siegel 1956, Table M). 
Value 
Table 4.9: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics and critical values 
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Higher bidding in pes than NR is also reflected in overbidding as a proportion 
of all bids, conditional on value, where overbidding refers to bidding above value, a 
dominated action. While it is dominated, it is a less costly mistake under pes than 
under NR. Empirically overbidding was much more common under pes: in NR it 
happened only 2 times in 360 decisions, supporting Hypothesis 3 for NR. In pes it 
happened 52 times in 660 decisions. This is common enough to lead to rejection of 
Hypothesis 3 for pes. Table 4.10 displays results on bids above value (aggregated 
over all sessions for each mechanism). 
Table 4.10: Proportions of bids above value 
Table 4.11 displays the median bids by value in each mechanism (aggregated over 
all sessions for each mechanism), for a given group of rounds. 
pes II NK I 
Value "29 I 45 I 90 " 29 I 45 I 90 I 
I RliJlo II ~~ I g~ I i~ II ~g I ~g Ilg I 
Table 4.11: Empirical median bid functions 
For all three values, and in both early and later rounds, the median bid under pes 
exceeds that under NR. 
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Bidding behavior in NR and pes and equilibrium predictions 
If all subjects used these median bids for each mechanism, PCS would produce the 
public good for profiles < 90,90,90 >, < 90,90,45 >, < 90,90,29 >, < 90,45,45 >, < 
90,45,29 >, and < 45,45,45 >. NR would produce for < 90,90,90 >, < 90,90,45 >, 
< 90,90,29 >, and < 90,45,45 >. 
The median bids suggest that in aggregate, subjects in PCS are not playing the 
most efficient symmetric, pure ENE. Since there are so many equilibria, it is difficult 
to rule out equilibrium as an explanation for aggregate bidding behavior. By a least 
squares criterion, the symmetric, pure ENE that best matches the empirical medians 
is {19, 31, 52}, but this exhibits different production behavior: it produces for all the 
same profiles as the median except < 45,45,45 >. In the set of symmetric, pure BNE 
that produce for the same profiles as the median bids, {19, 34, 49} has the best fit by 
least squares. 
For NR, the symmetric, pure BNE that best matched the aggregate empirical 
behavior by least squares is {23, 34, 45}, which is one of the most efficient for that 
mechanism. Yet under the median bids for NR, aggregate outcomes in that mech-
anism are not as efficient as in this equilibrium. Among the symmetric, pure BNE 
where production behavior matched that under the medians, {18, 30, 42} has the best 
fit by least squares. 
In neither mechanism do subjects converge to trivial equilibria. Subjects rarely 
submit ° bids. Table 4.12 shows the proportion of ° bids. 
More fundamental than equilibrium behavior is individually optimal behavior. 
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I Value II 29 I ~gSI 90 II 29 I ~~ 90 I 
II%LilO II :M! I :88i 1888 Ilg?~ I·ggg Ig88 I 
Table 4.12: Zero bids as proportion of all bids 
Thus it is also interesting to examine the expected payoffs from a given bid in pes 
and NR, given the distribution of bids in the population. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 illus-
trate these expected payoffs. These figures were constrcuted by taking the empirical 
distribution of bids over all sessions in each mechanism, irrespective of type, and 
convoluting it with itself. This gives a distribution over sums of bids for any two 
group members. Then (extending the notation for utility functions), for any given 
expected payoff. 
Visual inspection shows that for each type and mechanism, the median and mode 
(across all sessions) is relatively close to the expected payoff maximizing choice. For 
type 90 in NR, the median bid is exactly the one that maximizes the payoff, given 
the distribution of other bids. Especially for types 29 and 45 in each mechanism, 
the curves are relatively flat in the neighborhood of the expected payoff maximizing 
choice. This suggests that adaptive behavior processes would update slowly in these 
cases, for bids near the median. 
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Risk aversion as a possible explanation of overbidding 
At the same time, the risk neutral equilibrium is less successful in explaining individ-
ual behavior. One reason for this is bidding higher than that prescribed in any risk 
neutral equilibrium. 13 However, risk aversion may explain some of the overbidding 
in these public good auctions. There is evidence from other private goods auction 
experiments, and from field data, that subjects may be risk averse.H 
To look at risk aversion as a possible explanation, I recalculate the equilibrium sets 
for the three rules if the players have a utility function given by Ui(a) = (ViXi - Si)T, 
r = ~,~, and~. For SCS, there is no effect at all because truthful reporting is a 
dominant strategy equilibrium. However, risk aversion has a non-neutral effect for 
both PCS and NR. Intuitively, the effect of risk aversion should be to increase bids, 
for exactly the same reason as in private value auctions (Coeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 
2000). Increasing one's bid increases the probability of providing the public good, but 
increases the expected payment, too. At the margin, a risk averse player will pay more 
than a risk neutral player to reduce downside risk (i.e. the risk of non-provision), so 
they are willing to bid higher. Thus, risk aversion creates upward pressure on bids, 
leading to more frequent provision, and more frequent overpayment, relative to the 
predictions based on risk neutrality. Figures 4.8 and 4.9 give a three dimensional 
graph of the equilibrium sets for PCS and NR, respectively, for r = ~. 
13In the experiment, subject payoffs are in dollars, so all of the above results are subject to the 
caveat that I assumed subjects were risk neutral. 
14See Rabin (2000) for a critique of these finding about risk aversion in experimental and field 
data. That note argues that the levels of risk aversion estimated from experimental data are 
implausible because it implies far too much curvature, if one calibrates utility functions in terms of 
an individual's expected lifetime earnings. This reinforces the widely held belief that individuals 
do use expected lifetime income to frame most decision problems they face, but have a tendency to 
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As Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15 show, risk aversion tends to expand the range of bids 
part of some equilibrium, and weakly increases the upper bound of that range. As 
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 indicate, it improves the ability of some equilibrium to account 
for observed behavior (for example, for square root utility functions in PCS for 'U = 45, 
70% of empirical bids were in the equilibrium range of bids over the first five rounds, 
54% over the second five rounds, and 62% over all rounds). 
Value 29 90 II 29 90 
tUsk neutral 0-26 0-36 40 - 62 0-26 0-35 34 - 54 
r=l 0-27 0-37 46 - 72 0-28 0-37 37 - 58 
r=~ 0-28 0-39 46 - 80 0-28 0-37 46 - 66 
r=i 0-28 0-40 46 - 88 0-28 0-40 46 - 76 
Table 4.13: Equilibrium bid range by selected utility function exponents 
Value 29 45 90 
ltisk neutral .74, .75, .Z4 .5~ .49, ~4 .s0, ~, ·fi5 
r=l .76, .76, .76 .63, .52, .57 .50, .56, .53 
r=~ .78, .79, .79 .70, .54, .62 .57, .62, .59 
r=i .78, .79, .79 .77, .74, .76 .59, .63, .60 
Table 4.14: Empirical proportion of bids in equilibrium bid range, PCS 
NR 
Value 29 45 90 
Table 4.15: Empirical proportion of bids in equilibrium bid range, NR 
consider such problems in isolation. This is consistent with a prospect theoretic approach. 
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Risk aversion has a noticeable effect on the empirical proportion of bids falling in the 
equilibrium range, increasing it by 5 to 27 percentage points. Except for the values 
29 and 45 in PCS, this proportion is quite high for r = ±. These two exceptions are 
due to the relatively high proportion of bids above value in these cases (see Table 9). 
Of the bids that a rationality-based theory could explain (i.e., bids no greater than 
value), for v = 29 the proportion increases from .81 under risk neutrality to .86 under 
r = ±. For v = 45 it increases from .61 under risk neutrality to .87 under r = ±. 
Learning 
The results show little evidence of learning in any procedure at the individual level. I 
tested for learning for each value in PCS and NR by regressing bid on round. If there 
are no learning effects within a mechanism, each of these six lines plotting the bid as 
a function of round should have slope = O. In all six cases OLS regressions cannot 
reject this null hypothesis at the 5% level and rejection occurs for only one in six at 
the 10% level. The coefficients and standard errors are listed in Table 4.16; * denotes 
significance at a = .10. 15 Learning also does not appear to explain either change in 
overbidding, or in behavior consistent with equilibrium. 16 There is also very little 
evidence of learning in the SCS data. 
However, there is some evidence of a different kind of learning effect in the data, 
which is a sequencing effect. Recall that two mechanisms were run, in sequence, in 
each session. Behavior in PCS, for v = 29 and v = 45, is mildly sensitive to which 
15Statistical significance is probably overstated because the observations are not truly independent. 
160ne possible exception is bidding above value in NR with v = 29, but this was so rare in the 
first place (2 observations in 111) that generalization is difficult. 
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[ Value I pcs (OLS) NR (OLS) 
29 .00013111 -.481* (.254) 
45 -.257 .301) .125 (.257) 
90 -.329 .401) -.252 (.408) 
n- obU n - jbU 
Table 4.16: Results, Learning regressions 
mechanism was run first in the experimental sessions. The sequence effect on NR 
appears weaker. This is reflected in Figures 4.10 and 4.1l. Bids in PCS are less 
variable when it is run second than when it is run first. For v = 45 the CDF for 
PCS second is nearly first order stochastically dominated by that for PCS first. Also, 
there is no overbidding in PCS when it was run second, while it is somewhat common 
in sessions when it is run first. This is consistent with a more general finding that 
ovebidding declines with experience. For NR generalization seems more difficult. For 
v = 29 the CDF for NR second is first order stochastically dominated by that for NR 
first. For v = 45 in NR there is no clear effect. 
4.6.2 Groups: Efficiency Comparisons 
A major purpose of these experiments was to compare these mechanisms on efficiency 
grounds. The SCS mechanism has been argued for because of its attractive incentive 
properties, but ultimately its value depends on how efficiently it performs in com-
paris on to other simple mechanisms. The PCS and NR mechanisms are indeed very 
simple, and shares with SCS the attractive feature of individual rationality. 
There are several ways in which efficiency comparisons can be made. I focus 
on two: (a) the proportion of available total surplus extracted by each mechanism; 
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and (b) the proportion of times each mechanism makes the efficient decision. Both 
comparisons lead to the same conclusion. PCS significantly outperforms SCS and 
NR, with the latter two leading to approximately the same efficiency levels. 
Surplus extraction 
With total surplus extraction as the criterion, the PCS mechanism was clearly the 
best performing of the three mechanisms. As Table 14 shows, for almost all value 
profiles, PCS performs at least as well as, and sometimes much better (up to 50 
percentage points) than SCS. The main exception is the profile < 45,45,45 >, which 
is the only one where SCS outperforms PCS, and this differernce is based on a very 
small number of observations. Interestingly, SCS and PCS surplus extractions move 
in similar ways as the type profile varies, but SCS changes much more sharply with 
profiles. This gives it a "hit or miss" character: it typically either does very well at 
extracting surplus or it does very poorly. This is due to the relatively low variance 
in the underlying bids. PCS outperforms NR, for all profiles, a difference that is 
attributable to the consistently higher bids under PCS than NR. The SCS and NR 
mechanisms perform almost identically, although there is some minor profile-specific 
differences. These conclusions are also supported by a comparison of surplus over all 
profiles, given in the last row of Table 4.17. Entries in columns 2-4 are proportions 
of possible surplus extracted. Column 6 lists total available surplus for each profile. 
The number of observations of each profile is in parentheses. 
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Profile pes Surp~us Extracton I se I NR I Avadable surplus 
< 29,29,45 > .067 30 -2.30 12) .083 (12) 1 
< 29,45,45 > .379 29 .111 9) 0.00 (16) 17 
< 45,45,45 > .692 13 1.00 61 0.00 (7) 33 
< 29,29,90 > .500 9 0.00(11) .111 (9) 46 
< 29,45,90 > .595 42 .191(22) .400 (25) 62 
< 45,45,90 > .905 22 1.00 81 .857 (7) 78 
< 29,90,90 > .917 24 .729 (11) .8131161 107 
< 45,90,90 > .968 32 1.00 (12) .889 (18) 123 
< 90,90,90 > 1.00 11 1.00 7) 1.00 (6) 168 
Uverall .§l6 &84 .69) 
Table 4.17: Surplus extraction at each profile, by mechanism 
Proportion of Efficient Decisions 
A somewhat coarser view of efficiency is the proportion of successful decisions under 
each mechanism. For each group-round, I recorded a 1 if the group made the efficient 
production decision, and 0 otherwise. For ses, exclusion of the v = 29 member in a 
< 90,90,29 > profile did not result in a 0, to make it harder for other mechanisms to 
outperform it. Otherwise, the results mirror the findings of Table 4.17. The results 
are presented in Table 4.18; standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 4.18: Average success rate, by mechanism 
This table reinforces the conclusions based on surplus extraction. pes outperforms 
ses (supporting Hypothesis 4b), which outperforms NR (rejecting Hypothesis 5b, 
supporting Hypothesis 6b). However, this "hit rate" analysis doesn't capture the 
fine details of mechanism performance. For example, as noted earlier, most of the 
difference between NR and ses hit rates is due to the < 29,29,45 > profile where a 
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hit generates almost zero surplus. 
Robustness of Efficiency Results to Other Environments 
These efficiency results are for the specific parameters in the experiment, which leaves 
open the question of robustness across arbitrary environments. Recall that the dis-
tribution of valuations was chosen so that the amount of surplus varied a lot across 
different profiles. Thus, there is a lot of uncertainty in the environment. It is possible 
that in an environment with less uncertainty, for example if the likelihood of a 45 val-
uation was very high, SCS may have performed better because it was more successful 
at < 45,45,45 > than the auction mechanisms. However, at profiles other than this 
one, the relative ranking of PCS and SCS on efficiency grounds was very consistent, 
suggesting that the ranking is fairly robust. Compared to NR, SCS does well in high-
surplus profiles, while NR does better in low-surplus profiles. This suggests that in 
environments with sufficient heterogeneity of valuations, auction mechanisms, such 
as PCS, could be expected to perform better than SCS. 
Another aspect of the environment is the number of agents in the model. This 
experiment considered a small group, and leaves open the question of performance 
in larger groups. The incentive problems of PCS will become worse as group size 
increases. The exclusion inefficiencies also become worse for SCS, so the question 
is which effect dominates. I conjecture that the group size effect will tend to favor 
SCS over PCS, so that for sufficiently large groups, PCS will not perform as well as 
SCS. In fact, replicating the economy used in these experiments many times will send 
the production probability to zero in PCS and NR (c.f. AI-Najjar and Smorodinsky 
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2000; Mailath and Postlewaite 1990), but not in SCS. The hybrid mechanisms work 
by inducing agents to "buy" pivot probability with their contributions, and as cost 
grows with group size this becomes less beneficial for anyone agent. However, a 
version of PCS that allows for exclusion may do better than SCS. An example would 
be an auction mechanism where bidders are excluded if their bids fall below a reserve 
bid. In the limit, as the number of bidders goes to infinity, incentive compatibility will 
eventually imply equal cost shares (e.g. Ledyard and Palfrey 1999a, 1999b, 2002), so 
that optimal auction mechanisms for public goods will look similar to SCS. 
In addition to varying group size, allowing random exclusion in SCS would im-
prove its efficiency somewhat in this environment without compromising the incentive 
propertiesY Random exclusion could add up to 7.0889 (= 29p) units to the surplus 
extraction, conditional on the < 29,90,90 > profile occurring (a probability .1111 
event). This by itself would not overturn efficiency comparisons in these experiments. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to compare 
the performance of the Serial Cost Sharing mechanism to two public good auction 
mechanisms that are not incentive compatible. These alternative mechanisms are 
both simple to understand and to implement, they are individually rational, and one 
of them is budget balancing. I fully characterize the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria 
17With two H messages and one L message, the player reporting L can consume with probability 
p = * = .2444 without comprising any incentive constraints. Under this exclusion rule, type 45 
earns 45p = 11 by reporting L, and 45 - 34 = 11 by reporting M. Types 29 and 90 are still strictly 
better off reporting truthfully. 
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under the auction mechanisms, for this experimental environment, and establish some 
general properties of the equilibrium sets. The three mechanisms have systematic 
theoretical differences both in terms of the individual and collective behavior they 
induce. These theoretical properties are reflected in the data. 
The dominant strategy equilibrium in SCS explained subject behavior fairly well. 
Deviations from dominant strategy can be accounted for by Quantal Response Equi-
librium. PCS induced significantly higher bidding than NR, and bidding above value 
was quite rare in NR. The relatively high bidding behavior parallels a well-documented 
phenomena in private good auctions (Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey 2002). Risk aversion 
is one possible explanation for overbidding. All these findings, with the exception 
of systematic overbidding, supported the main hypotheses. There little evidence of 
learning, with the one exception that bids in PCS are lower among subjects who have 
previously participated in the NR mechanism. 
As hypothesized, SCS was outperformed on welfare grounds - both the surplus 
extracted and the likelihood of an efficient decision -- by PCS, in spite of the fact that 
PCS is not incentive compatible and is plagued with multiple equilibria. I find this 
result surprising, because of the combination of incentive problems and coordination 
problems in PCS, and it suggests that more research on auction-like public goods 
mechanisms is warranted. The key advantage of PCS is that it never inefficiently 
excludes any users of the public good, and it allows unequal cost shares, so high value 
users can subsidize low value ones. Thus it overcomes the primary two sources of 
inefficiency in SCS applied to public goods. Another auction mechanism, NR, which 
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is neither strategy proof nor budget balanced, also overcomes these difficulties, but 
did not perform as well. The NR mechanism produced efficiency levels about the 
same as SCS. This indicates that the fine details of the auction mechanism can have 
important consequences. These findings echo similar results about the role of rebates 
for non-excludable public goods, reported in Ferejohn, Forsythe, Noll, and Palfrey 
(1982). 
These results suggest several directions for further work, both experimentally and 
theoretically. Experimentally, it would be instructive to compare the performance of 
PCS and SCS in other environments and to other mechanisms that have interesting 
theoretical properties. One important example is the pivot mechanism. The standard 
pivot mechanism is not individually rational and does not balance the budget, but 
hybrid mechanisms that retain some features of the pivot mechanism, while allowing 
for exclusion or an opt-out stage, might be interesting to study. Auction procedures 
that allow for exclusion also warrant consideration. Such mechanisms could offer 
probabilities of public good consumption; agents would be excluded probabilistically. 
This could make each agent pivotal more often, and enhance efficiency as a result. A 
plurality voting scheme, in which agents vote over quantities and share ~ of the cost 
of the plurality winner, is another interesting and practically relevant procedure. 
Finally, the evidence I find indicating risk aversion suggests that the Bayesian 
mechanism design approach to public good provision should be extended to allow 
for environments with risk averse players. One would conjecture that the optimal 
mechanisms may differ significantly in small groups. This contrasts with the case 
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of very large groups, where the convergence results in Ledyard and Palfrey (2001) 
indicate that risk aversion will not affect the form of the optimal mechanism. 
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 4.2: Consider player i, suppose bi > Vi, let b~ = Vi, and fix 
i suffers a loss at that profile under bi: bi = C- 2.:#i bj(vj) implies si(b) = bi > Vi, and 
If L#i bj(vj) = 0, then Si = C > Vi. But i earns ° payoff at such a profile with b:. 
a bid of b~ costs less than bi , but does not affect the collective decision. Third, if 
L#i bj(vj) + bi < C at any value profile V, i earns 0 payoff with both b~ and bi. • 
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Pi(bi) > ° implies that the good is produced for at least some 
profiles. At all such profiles ~ > O. At any profiles where the good is not produced, 
os· 0 ob; = . • 
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Consider two values Vi and v~ for player i, and some bid 
function such that bi(Vi) = band bi(vD = b'. For i to optimize, the following inequal-
ities must hold: 
ViPi(b) - Si(b) ~ ViPi(b') - Si(b') 
Subtracting RHS of the second from LHS of the first, and LHS of the second from 
RHS of the first yields 
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Then there are two cases to consider. First, Pi (b) > Pi (b'). Then if 1Ji > v~, b > b' 
follows from the definition of a CDF. Second, Pi(b) = Pi(b') > 0. Then suppose 
that Vi > V: but b~ > b; by Lemma 1 this implies Si(b') > Si(b), which implies 
v~Pi(b') - Si(b') < v:Pi(b) - Si (b), which contradicts the assumption that i optimizes . 
• 
Proof of Proposition 4.6: Focus on P(bM ), as P(bH ) must be strictly positive if P(bM ) 
is. If P(bM ) = 0, then only at the profile < 90,90,90 > is the public good produced 
(or else the equilibrium is trivial). Then the equilibrium bid bH can only be 34. 
But v = 45 has a profitable deviation to b' = 34 in that case, which contradicts the 
assumption of equilibrium. 
If P(bL ) = ° in a nontrivial symmetric equilibrium, then bH < 51. In any such 
strategy profile, some type has a profitable deviation. Consider two cases. First, if 
bH E [37,51]' then v = 29 has a profitable deviation to 102 - 2bH , contradicting the 
assumption of equilibrium. Second, if bH < 37, then bM ;?: 30, since < 45,90,90 > 
produces in any equilibrium where < 90,90,90 > produces. Further, bH ;?: 34 or 
else < 90,90,90 > does not produce. But for a bid function {l, Tn, h}, h E [34,36]' 
Tn E [30, h], l E [0,102 - 2h), Vi = 90 has a profitable deviation to 102 - Tn -t. With 
this deviation, at V-i = (90,90), (90,45), (45,90), and (45,45), Vi = 90's payoff goes 
from 56 to 39, but at profiles V-i = (45,29), (29,45), (90,29), and (29,90), Vi = 90's 
payoff goes from ° to 22. This contradicts the assumption of equilibrium. • 
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Proof of Proposition 4.8: I prove this by recursively considering all possible devia-
tions. The order of the recursion is determined by 2bM 5 bL + bH . 
First consider the case where 2bM > bL + bH . Focus on player i. Consider a 
deviation from bV to d1 E [0, max[102 - 2bH , 0]]. All bids in this interval result in 
the same production decision as di = 0, and di = 0 never costs more than any of 
them. Consider next a deviation to d2 E (max[102 - 2bH , 0], max[102 - bH - bM , 0]]. 
Such a deviation produces at the same profiles as d; = max[102 - 2bH , 0] and costs 
more than d;. Consider a deviation to d3 E (max[102 - bH - bM , 0]' 102 - 2bM ). This 
produces at the same profiles as d; = max[102 - bH - bM , 0] and costs more than 
d;. Consider a deviation to d4 E (102 - 2bM , 102 - bL - bH ). This produces at the 
same profiles as d~ = 102 - 2bM and costs more than d~. Consider a deviation to d5 E 
(102 - bL - bH , 102 - bL - bM ). This produces at the same profiles as d~ = 102 - bL - bH 
and costs more than d~. Consider a deviation to d6 E (102 - bL - bM , 102 - 2bL ). This 
produces at the same profiles as d~ = 102 - bL - bM and costs more than d~. Finally, 
consider a deviation to d7 E (102 - 2bL , 102). This produces at the same profiles as 
d~ = 102 - 2bL and costs more than d~. 
Second, if 2bM < bL+bH , consider d3 E (max[102-b H -bM , 0], max[102-bH -bL , 0]) 
and d3 E (max[102 - bII - bL , 0], 102 - 2bM ), rather than d3 E (max[102 - bH -
bM , 0], 102 - 2bM ) and d4 E (102 - 2bM , 102 - bL - bH ). • 
Proof of Proposition 4.9: The proof relies on no distortion at the top and binding 
adjacent incentive constraints. Let tv be the expected payment of type v. Conditional 
on reporting v = 29, the probability of consumption is ~, so v = 45's incentive 
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constraint is (45 - 29)~ ~ 45 - t45, or t 45 ~ 30.7778. Then v = 90's incentive 
constraint is 90 - 30.7778 ~ 90 - t90 or t90 ~ 30.7778. But feasibility requires 
~ (29) + 30.7778 + t90 ;? ~~ (102) or t90 ;? 41.6667. Thus feasibility and incentive 
compatibility cannot both be satisfied. • 
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Appendix B: Instructions 
Decision making experiment 
This is an experiment in group decision making. You will be paid for your partic-
ipation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Your payment depends partly on your 
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. No other partic-
ipant will be told how much you earn in the experiment, and you are not obligated 
to tell anyone else how much you earn. To keep track of your earnings during the 
experiment, we use an experimental currency, which we call francs. Francs are then 
redeemed for cash at the end of the experiment. Each franc is worth (exchange rate) 
dollars. 
We will start with a brief instruction period, during which the experiment, the 
decisions you are to make, and how you earn money will be explained to you. Please 
listen carefully and raise your hand if you have a question. DO NOT write anything 
down yet, and do not pick up the die. After the instructions, we will have two practice 
rounds to familiarize you with the decision making procedure. 
All interaction between you will take place via your decision sheets. Please do not 
try to communicate with each other in any other way; if you do, you will be asked to 
leave the experiment and will not be paid. 
We will now pass out your decision and record sheets. The first of these sheets 
is for the first part of the experiment, on which you will record your decisions and 
payoffs for each round. We will collect these after the first part of the experiment is 
over. The second is a record sheet for the whole experiment, which you will use keep 
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track of your earnings throughout the entire experiment. 
We will also assign subject numbers, starting in the front on your right with #1, 
to help keep track of which decision sheet belongs to which participant. Please write 
your subject number in the space provided on both of your record sheets. 
Serial Cost Sharing 
The experiment consists of a sequence of rounds, and in each round you will be 
anonymously grouped with two other participants. To determine the groupings in 
the first round, numbered ping pong balls will be drawn out of a box, three at a 
time. The subjects with the first three numbers drawn will in the group 1, subjects 
with the next three numbers drawn will be in group 2, and so forth. You will NOT 
see the numbers on the balls that are drawn; therefore, you will not know who is 
in your group. Thus, decisions in the experiment are anonymous in the sense that 
no other participant will know what group you are in or what decisions you make. 
DEMONSTRATE. 
In the second round and in each subsequent round, we will again draw the ping 
pong balls three at a time to determine new group assignments. 
Therefore, in each round each of you are assigned to exactly one group. What 
happens in the groups you do not belong to has no effect on your payoff. In this 
sense, groups are completely independent of each other. 
In each round, your group of three participants must decide whether or not to 
purchase a fictitious good called a gadget, and exactly which members of your group 
are allowed to use the gadget. For your group to purchase a gadget, your group must 
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pay a total of 102 francs. It is possible that not everyone in your group is allowed to 
use the gadget. Those members of your group who are allowed to use the gadget are 
called " users" and pay an equal share of the cost. Those members of your group who 
are not allowed to use the gadget are called "nonusers" and do not pay any share 
of the cost. Therefore, if all members are users, the cost is split three ways, so each 
member pays 34 francs. If only two members are users, the cost is split two ways, 
and each of the two users pays 51 francs, and if only one member is a user, then this 
user pays the entire 102 francs. 
If you are a user in a round, you earn for that round an amount called YOUR 
USER VALUE. Your user value is determined at the beginning of each round in the 
following way. At the beginning of each round, we will come to you privately one at 
a time and let you throw a fair six-sided die. If you roll a 1 or 2, your user value will 
be 29 francs. If you roll a 3 or 4, your user value will be 45 francs. If you roll a 5 or 
6, your user value will be 90 francs. [write on board] Your user value determines how 
much you earn in francs if your group buys the gadget and you are a user. Record 
this user value in the space of your record sheet labeled YOUR USER VALUE, on 
the line corresponding to the round. Notice that no one else in your group knows 
your user value, and you do not know the user value of anyone else in your group. 
You only know your own user value. If you are a non-user in a round, you earn zero 
in that round, regardless of what your user value is. 
To determine whether your group buys the gadget III a round, every member 
of the group will simultaneously submit a message. Every participant must choose 
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one of three messages: high, medium, or low. WRITE ON BOARD: ALLOWABLE 
MESSAGES; "HIGH", "MEDIUM", "LOW". You are free to submit any of these 
three messages in any round. To submit your message, record it on your record sheet 
in the column labeled YOUR MESSAGE, and we will collect all the sheets. 
The messages are used to determine whether your group buys the gadget, and 
which members are users. If you submit "Low" then you are a non-user and your 
earnings for that round are zero, regardless of the messages other members send. If 
you send "Middle" that means that you are willing to be a user only if the cost is 
split three ways. "High" means that you are willing to be a user if the cost is split 
either two ways or three ways. The table on the board summarizes how messages are 
converted into purchase decisions. 
Thus, if you announce low in a round, you will not have to pay anything, but 
you will not earn anything even if your group purchases the gadget. If you announce 
medium, you will pay 34 francs of the cost - a three-way split - and receive your user 
value, only if the group purchases the gadget. This purchase will occur as long as the 
other two member of your group both announce either medium or high. Similarly, if 
you announce high and no member announces low, you will pay 34 francs - a three-
way split - and receive your user value. However, if you announce high and exactly 
one other member annOUnces high and one other member announces low, your group 
will purchase the gadget. In this one case, you will pay 51 francs - a two-way split 
- and receive your user value. This information is summarized in the table on the 
board. 
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To help you understand this table, we will now go through each line of it. Every 
possible set of three messages is depicted on the table. Therefore, the table shows 
every possible combination of group decisions, number of users, and the share of the 
cost users must pay. The first line shows the outcome if all three messages in a group 
are HIGH. In that case, everyone claims to be willing to share up to half the cost of 
the gadget; therefore, all 3 members have an equal 1/3 share of the cost, 34 francs. 
The second line shows the case where the messages are 2 HIGH and 1 MEDIUM. The 
high messages imply a willingness to share at least 1/3 of the cost and up to 1/2 if 
necessary; the medium messages implies a willingness to share no more than 1/3 of 
the cost. Therefore, all 3 members are users and have an equal share of the cost, 34 
francs. If the messages are as in the third and fourth lines - 1 HIGH and 2 MEDIUM, 
or 3 MEDIUM - again all group members claim to be willing to share no less than 
1/3 the cost of the good. Again this means that all 3 members are users, and all have 
an equal 34 franc share of the cost. In the fifth line, there are 2 HIGH messages and 
1 LOW. 2 members are willing to share up to 1/2 the cost of the gadget, while one 
member is not willing to share any of the cost. This member is therefore not a user 
and does not share any of the cost. The two members who send HIGH messages, 
however, are users, and they will split the cost equally between the two of them -
51 francs each. These five lines reflect ever possible way the group can purchase the 
good. In the next line there is one message of each type, high, medium and low. 
Therefore 1 member is willing to share up to 1/2 the cost if necessary; 1 member is 
willing to share 1/3 the cost but no more; and one member is willing to share none of 
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the cost. This is not enough to cover the whole cost, so the group does not purchase 
the gadget. Therefore, no one is a user, and there is no cost to share. The next line 
is similar: one member is willing to share up to 1/2 the cost, but the other two claim 
to be willing to share none of it. This is not enough to cover the whole cost, so the 
group does not purchase, no one is a user, and there is no cost to share. In the next 
3 lines, no member is willing to share up to 1/2 the cost. In line 7, 2 are willing to 
share 1/3 and 1 is willing to share none. In line 8, 1 is willing to share 1/3 and 2 
are willing to share none. In both cases, there is not enough to cover the cost, so the 
group does not purchase the gadget, no one is a user, and there is no cost to share. 
Finally, in line 9, no member is willing to share any of the cost - therefore the group 
does not purchase the gadget, no one is a user, and there is again no cost to share. 
These five lines exhaust all the possible ways a group can decide not to purchase the 
gadget. 
(Go through overhead of Part I record sheet.) 
Your decision and record sheet is now displayed on the overhead. The first column 
lists the round. The next column is where you will record YOUR USER VALUE for 
a round, which you will determine by the throw of a die at the start of each round. 
After you learn your value, you will decide on a message, and in each round write it 
in the third column. We will then collect the decision sheets and fill in for you the 
messages of your other group members, which will be listed in the next two columns. 
The decisions sheets will then be returned, so that YOU can calculate your cost share, 
whether you are a user, and your payoff. When this is complete we will go on to the 
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next round. 
I will now explain how to calculate whether your are a user and your cost share 
in any round. Please listen carefully, as if you record your cost share incorrectly, you 
may shortchange yourself. In every round, to calculate your cost share, find the one 
of the following cases that applies to you, and record the information on your record 
sheet: 
1. If YOUR MESSAGE is LOW, your cost share is ZERO and you are not a user. 
This is true no matter what the other messages are in your group. 
2. If YOUR MESSAGE is MEDIUM and the neither of the other two messages 
in your group is LOW, then you are a user. Your cost share is 34. 
3. If YOUR MESSAGE is MEDIUM and at least one of the other two messages 
in your group is LOW, you are not a user. Your cost share is ZERO. 
4. If YOUR MESSAGE is HIGH and neither of the other two messages is low, 
you are a user. Your cost share is 34. 
5. If YOUR MESSAGE is HIGH and one of the other two messages is LOW and 
the other is HIGH, you are a user. Your cost share is 51. 
6. If YOUR MESSAGE is HIGH and at least one of the other messages is LOW, 
and neither of the other messages is HIGH, then you are not a user. Your cost share 
is ZERO. 
In each round you will fall into exactly one of these cases. We will leave this up for 
the duration of the experiment so you can determine your cost share easily. (Solicit 
questions. ) 
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We will now go through two practice matches, to help make the procedures more 
concrete. Please note that you are not paid for the practice matches. When you have 
written down your decision in each round, place your decision sheet UPSIDE DOWN 
on top of your monitor so we can come pick it up. 
DO PRACTICE ROUND PI; solicit questions. 
We will now proceed to practice round P2. This practice round is exactly like 
practice round PI. New groups will be formed using the ping pong balls, each of 
your new values will be randomly assigned by rolling a die in private, and you will 
be asked to decide which message to send. 
DO PRACTICE ROUND P2 AND RETURN DECISION SHEETS. 
We will now proceed to the first actual round. There will be 10 rounds. Each 
round will be conducted exactly like the two practice rounds. 
BEGIN FIRST PAID ROUND. 
AFTER LAST ROUND IN PART I: 
The first part of the experiment is now over. Please add your payoffs in francs 
from each round and write the total in the space on the Part I record sheet. Then 
multiply this total in francs by the exchange rate to get your dollar earnings from 
Part 1. Write down your dollar earnings in the space provided both on your Part I 
record sheet and the whole experiment record sheet. We will then collect the Part I 
record sheets and distribute record sheets for Part II. 
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Proportional Cost Sharing 
In this part of the experiment, the determination of your group and your user 
value are the same as before, but the decision making and cost sharing procedures 
are different. 
As before, you will be assigned a new value at the beginning of each round by 
rolling a die. The cost for your group to purchase the gadget is still 102 francs. Now, 
however, instead of having only three messages, high, medium or low, your message 
will be an integer from 0 to 102, which we will call YOUR BID. In any round, you 
may submit any integer you like in this range. If the sum of the bids in your group 
is at least 102, your group purchases the gadget and everyone is a user, regardless of 
what bid they submit. If the sum of bids in your group is less than the cost of the 
gadget, your group does not purchase the gadget. 
If your group purchases the gadget in a round, you will be paid your user value 
for that round. However, you will also have to pay a share of the cost. Specifically, 
your share of the cost will be the ratio of your bid to the sum of all three bids in 
your group, times 102 francs. See formula on board. In other words, you will share a 
fraction of the 102 franc cost that is proportional to your bid. If the sum of the bids 
is 102, you pay your bid. If the sum is greater than 102, you pay less than your bid. 
Note, therefore, that you will never have to pay more than your bid. 
If your group does not purchase the gadget in a round, there is no cost to share 
and you do not get your USER VALUE of the gadget; therefore you are paid 0 Francs. 
Therefore, your payment in every round will be OVERHEAD: 
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·0 Francs if your group does not purchase the gadget, i.e., (YOUR BID + OTHER 
2 BIDS) < 102 
. YOUR VALUE - 102*(YOUR BID)/(YOUR BID + OTHER 2 BIDS) if your 
group does purchase the gadget, i.e., if (YOUR BID + OTHER 2 BIDS) ;:::: 102. 
To sum up, there are three specific differences from the first part: 
1. Your bid is any number between 0 and 102, rather than just a message High, 
Medium or Low. 
2. Different people in the group may have different shares of the cost - the cost is 
not automatically split equally among users. 
3. There is no difference between users and non-users. If your group purchases 
the gadget, you automatically use it, and therefore you get your value for the gadget, 
no matter what your bid was for that round. 
Your decision and record sheet for Part II is displayed on the overhead. PLEASE 
WRITE YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER IN THE SPACE AT THE TOP. Again in each 
round you will record your value in the second column, and then your bid in the third. 
When all bids have been recorded, we will collect the decision sheets and fill in the 
columns with the bids of your group members, as well as the sum of ALL THREE 
BIDS in your group, including yours. Decision sheets will then be returned so that 
YOU can calculate your cost share and your payoff. Note that you will not calculate 
whether you are a user or not, because if the sum of the bids is greater than 102, 
you are automatically a user. In making all calculations, round to the nearest whole 
number. 
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To help you calculate your cost share in any round, always follow the following 
steps. It is important that you listen carefully so that you are paid what you truly 
earn in the experiment. 
1. If the sum of the bids is LESS THAN 102, your cost share is ZERO and you 
do not use the gadget. 
2. If the sum of the bids is AT LEAST 102, then to calculate your cost share you: 
A. enter YOUR BID in your calculator 
B. press * or x on the calculator 
C. press 102 
D. press = 
E. press / or -;- on your calculator 
F. enter the sum of bids in your group 
G. press =. 
The number that appears next is your cost share. If this cost share is not a whole 
number, round it to the nearest whole number. Write the result on your record sheet. 
In other words: to find your cost share, multiply your bid by 102, and divide the 
result by the sum of bids in your group. If your answer is ever greater than your 
bid, you made a mistake. To make this part more concrete, we will have two practice 
matches. The practice matches do not count toward your earnings. 
No Rebates 
In this part of the experiment, everything is as before except the rule for calcu-
lating your cost. The determination of your group and your user value are the same 
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as before, as are the bids you can make and the rule to determine whether you are a 
user. Only the cost sharing procedure is different. 
If the sum of bids is at least 102 so your group does purchase the gadget, your 
cost is simply YOUR BID. In every round where your group purchases the gadget, 
you are paid your USER VALUE for that round minus YOUR BID for that round. 
NOTE that if your bid in any round is larger than your user value for that round 
AND your group purchases the gadget, you will LOSE MONEY in that round. If 
your group does not purchase the gadget in a round, that is, the sum of bids in your 
group in that round is less than 102, there is no cost to share and you do not get your 
USER VALUE of the gadget; therefore you are paid 0 Francs. 
In other words: if the sum of the bids in your group is at least 102, you are paid 
your user value AND you will have to pay your bid. This is true regardless of how 
much you bid. If the sum of bids in your group is less than 102, you are paid 0 and 
you don't have to pay anything. Thus, the bids are used to determine both whether 
your group purchases the gadget and what your cost will be. 
Therefore, your payment in every round will be: 
·0 Francs if your group does not purchase the gadget, i.e., (YOUR BID + OTHER 
2 BIDS) < 102 
. YOUR VALUE - YOUR BID if your group does purchase the gadget, I.e., if 
(YOUR BID + OTHER 2 BIDS) ;:=: 102. 
(Put these on overhead. Go through overhead of Part I record sheet.) 
Your decision and record sheet is now displayed on the overhead and I will now 
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explain how to fill it out. The first column lists the round of the experiment. The 
next column is where you will record YOUR USER VALUE for a round, which you 
will determine by the throw of a die at the start of each round. After you learn 
your value, you will decide on a bid, and in each round write it in the third column. 
When all bids have been recorded, we will collect the decision sheets and fill in the 
columns with the bids of your group members, as well as the sum of ALL THREE 
BIDS in your group, including yours. Decision sheets will then be returned so that 
YOU can calculate your cost share and your payoff. When you have calculated your 
cost share and payoff, write them in the spaces provided for that round. In making 
all calculations, round to the nearest whole number. 
DO PRACTICE ROUND PI. 
We will now go through two practice matches, to help make the procedures more 
concrete. Please note that you are not paid for the practice matches. When you have 
written down your decision in each round, place your decision sheet UPSIDE DOWN 
on top of your monitor so we can come pick it up. (Solicit questions.) 
We will now proceed to practice round P2. This practice round is exactly like 
practice round PI. New groups will be formed using the ping pong balls, each of 
your new values will be randomly assigned by rolling a die in private, and you will 
be asked to decide which message to send. 
DO PRACTICE ROUND P2 AND RETURN DECISION SHEETS; Solicit ques-
tions. 
We will now proceed to the first actual round. There will be 10 rounds. Each 
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round will be conducted exactly like the two practice rounds. 
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